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 Abstract 
 
 
 
Theory and evidence have raised concerns that microcredit does more harm than good, 
particularly when offered at high interest rates. We use a clustered randomized trial, and 
household surveys of eligible borrowers and their businesses, to estimate impacts from an 
expansion of group lending at 110% APR by the largest microlender in Mexico. Average 
effects on a rich set of outcomes measured 18-34 months post-expansion suggest some good 
and little harm. Other estimators identify heterogeneous treatment effects and effects on 
outcome distributions, but again yield little support for the hypothesis that microcredit causes 
harm. 
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I.  Introduction 
The initial promise of microcredit, including such accolades as the 2006 Nobel Peace 
Prize,  has  given  way  to  intense  debate  about  if  and  when  it  is  actually  an  effective 
development tool. A clear theoretical and empirical tension exists: innovations in lending 
markets, under the “microcredit movement”, aim to expand access to credit by lowering 
transaction  costs  and  mitigating  information  asymmetries.  Yet  theories  and  empirical 
evidence from behavioral economics raises concerns about overborrowing at available 
rates, and have drawn much media and political attention in India, Bolivia, the United 
States,  Mexico,  and  elsewhere.  Moreover,  there  may  be  negative  spillovers  from 
borrowers to non-borrowers, such as business stealing. Revealed preference may not be a 
sufficient starting point for welfare analysis: people may borrow based on present-biases 
that make debt seem attractive ex-ante, yet ultimately make them worse off in the sense 
that in a moment of informed ex-ante reflection they would not have borrowed as much. 
These biases may work through preferences (e.g., beta-delta discounting), expectations 
(e.g., over-optimism), and/or price perceptions (e.g., underestimating exponential growth 
and decline).
2 
 
Both sets of theories can have merit. Fo r example, unbiased borrowers may use credit 
well, and benefit from expanded credit access, while others may borrow too much, and 
suffer  from  expanded  access.  Does  such  heterogeneity  in  impacts  exist?  Existing 
empirical evidence is limited, and mixed. Most of the evidence on the impacts of small-
dollar credit thus far has been on mean outcomes, or on a limited examination of 
heterogeneous treatment effects.
3  But expanded credit access could produce welfare 
losses for some borrowers even in the absence of me an negative impacts. If enough 
people are harmed—where “enough” depends on one’s social welfare weights—null or 
even positive mean impacts can mask net negative welfare consequences. 
 
Using a large-scale clustered randomized trial that substantially expanded access to group 
lending in north-central Sonora, Mexico, we provide evidence on impacts of expanded 
access  to  microcredit  on  outcome  means  and  distributions  measured  from  detailed 
household  surveys.  We  do  this  for  a  broad  set  of  outcomes,  including  credit  access, 
perceived  creditworthiness,  use  of  funds,  business  outcomes,  income,  consumption, 
health,  education,  female  decision-making  power,  social  attitudes,  and  subjective 
measures of well-being and financial condition.   
 
                                                 
2  See, e.g., DellaVigna (2009) for a discussion and review of such issues. 
3 Randomized-control evaluations of joint-liability microlending at lower interest rates by non-
profits (Banerjee et al. 2009; Crepon et al. 2011), or a for-profit bank (Attanasio et al. 2011), or 
individual liability loans  (Karlan and Zinman 2010; Karlan and Zinman 2011; Augs burg et al. 
2012) find somewhat positive but not transformational treatment effects. Further studies have 
found a wide range of impacts from business grants  (de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2008; 
Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungooden 2011; Fafchamps et al. 2011; Karlan, Knight, and Udry 2012) , 
and from relatively large loans (Gine and Mansuri (2011)). See Karlan and Morduch (2009) for a 
broader literature review that includes non-experimental estimates of mean impacts.   2 
 
Strong  impacts  in  either  direction  seem  plausible  in  our  setting.  The  market  rate  for 
microloans  is  about  100%  APR,  making  concerns  about  overborrowing  and  negative 
impacts plausible. But existing evidence suggests that returns to capital in Mexico are 
about 200% for microentrepreneurs (D. J. McKenzie and Woodruff 2006; D. McKenzie 
and Woodruff 2008), raising the possibility of transformative positive impacts. 
 
Compartamos Banco (Compartamos) implemented the experiment. Compartamos is the 
largest microlender in Mexico, and targets working-age women who operate a business or 
are interested in starting one.
4  In early 2009 we worked with Compartamos to randomize 
its rollout into an area it had not previously lent, North -Central Sonora State (near the 
Arizona  border).  Specifically,  we  randomized  loan  promotion —door-to-door  for 
treatment, none for control—across 238 geographic “clusters” (neighborhoods in urban 
areas, towns or contiguous towns in rural areas). Compartamos also verified addresses to 
maximize compliance with the experimental protocol of lending only to those who live in 
treatment  clusters. Treatment assignment strongly  predicts  the depth  of Compartamos 
penetration: during the study period, according to analysis from merging our survey data 
with Compartamos administrative data, 18.9% (1565) of those surveyed in the treatment 
areas had taken out Compartamos loans, whereas only 5.8% (485) of those surveyed in 
the  control  areas  had  taken  out  Compartamos  loans.  We  conducted  16,560  detailed 
business/household follow-up surveys during 2011 and 2012, up to three years, and an 
average of 26 months, since the beginning of the credit expansion. 
 
Random assignment of treatment creates a control group that helps identify the causal 
impacts of access to credit by addressing the counterfactual “what would have happened 
had Compartamos not entered this market?” This addresses two selection biases: demand-
level decisions on whether to borrow, and supply-level decisions on where to lend. For 
example,  under  the  canonical  view  of  microcredit  we  would  expect  borrowers  to  be 
talented and spirited in ways that are difficult to control for using observational data. 
Such unobservables may be correlated with both self-selection into borrowing (borrowers 
with more potential have more to gain from borrowing) and good longer-run outcomes 
(e.g., more successful businesses). This pattern would bias estimates of the effects of 
microcredit  upward;  e.g.,  a  positive  correlation  between  longer-run  outcomes  and 
microcredit  would  be  due,  perhaps  largely,  to  the  effect  of  unobserved  borrower 
characteristics rather than to the causal effect of credit itself. On the supply side, lenders 
may select on growth potential, and hence lend more in areas (and to borrowers) that are 
likely to improve over the evaluation horizon. Again, this means an observed positive 
correlation between outcomes and borrowing (or lending) would be driven by unobserved 
characteristics of the borrowers (communities, and/or lending strategies), not necessarily 
by the causal impacts of the credit itself. Understanding the causal impacts of borrowing 
and credit access informs theory, practice, and policy.   
 
The randomized program placement design used here (see also, e.g., Crepon et al (2011), 
Banerjee et al (2009), and Attanasio et al (2011)) has advantages and disadvantages over 
individual-level randomization strategies (e.g., Karlan and Zinman (2010), Karlan and 
                                                 
4   See  http://www.compartamos.com/wps/portal/Grupo/InvestorsRelations/FinancialInformation 
for annual and other reports from 2010 onward,. 3 
 
Zinman (2011) and Augsburg et al (2012)). Randomized program placement effectively 
measures treatment effects at the community level (more precisely: at the level of the unit 
of randomization), assuming no spillovers from treatment to control across community 
boundaries (we are not  aware of any prior studies with evidence of such spillovers). 
Measuring treatment effects at the community level has the advantage of incorporating 
any  within-community  spillovers.  These  could  in  theory  be  positive  (due,  e.g.,  to 
complementarities across businesses) or negative (due, e.g., to zero-sum competition). 
Our estimated effects on the treatment group, relative to control, are net of any within-
treatment group spillovers from borrowers to non-borrowers. Capturing spillovers with 
individual-level randomization is more difficult. But individual-level randomization can 
be done at lower cost because it typically delivers a larger take-up differential between 
treatment and control, thereby improving statistical power for a given sample size.   
 
We start by estimating mean treatment effects (average intent-to-treat), and then take five 
approaches to examining distributional shifts and heterogeneous treatment effects. First 
we estimate effects on outcome variance and second we examine whether differences in 
variance are captured entirely by the variables we observe. Third, we estimate quantile 
treatment effects. Fourth, we estimate treatment effects on the likelihood that an outcome 
variable increased or decreased, for the sub-sets of outcomes and respondents for which 
we have panel data. Fifth, we examine whether treatment effects vary heterogeneously 
with baseline characteristics such as prior business ownership, education, location, and 
income, and (nonstandard) preferences. 
 
The mean treatment effects suggest some good and little harm. Of the 34 more-ultimate 
outcomes for which we estimate treatment effects in the full sample, we find 8 treatment 
effects  that  are  positive  with  at  least  90%  confidence,  and  only  one  statistically 
significant negative effect (0 when we adjust for multiple hypothesis testing). There is 
evidence of both increased business investment and improved consumption smoothing. 
Happiness, trust in others, and female intra-household decision power also increase. 
 
We also find evidence of changes in dispersion. Of the 29 non-binary outcomes tested, 
we find statistically significant increases in eight, and statistically significant decreases in 
seven  (both  with  and  without  adjustment  for  multiple  hypothesis  testing).  Variance 
increases in the treatment group relative to control for total and Compartamos borrowing 
(both for the number of loans and the amount of loans), business revenues and expenses, 
and household expenditures on groceries and on school and medical expenses. Variance is 
lower for informal borrowing, nights the respondent did not go hungry, asset purchases, 
remittances received, fraction of children not working, lack of depression, and decision-
making power. 
 
We estimate quantile treatment effects and show that there are meaningful effects on the 
shape of outcome distributions, particularly in the form of positive treatment effects in 
the right tail: revenues, expenses, profits, groceries, and school and medical expenses 
each have this pattern. Treatment effects on happiness and on trust in people increase 
throughout their distributions. There is little evidence of negative impacts in the left tails 4 
 
of distributions, alleviating (but not directly addressing) concerns that expanded credit 
access might adversely impact people with the worst baseline outcomes. 
 
Overall we do not find strong evidence that the credit expansion creates large numbers of 
“losers” as well as winners. None of the 17 outcomes for which we have panel data 
shows significant increases in the likelihood of worsening over time in treatment relative 
to control areas. In the sub-group analysis, there are hints that some sub-groups— in 
particular, those with lower incomes, and those without prior formal credit experience or 
with experience in an informal savings group—experience negative treatment effects on 
balance, but the evidence is statistically weak: only those three sub-groups, out of 20 sub-
groups, have more than three negative treatment effects out of the 34 we count as having 
fairly strong normative implications (and after adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing). 
 
Our results come with several caveats. Cross-cluster spillovers could bias our estimates in 
an indeterminate direction. External validity to other settings is uncertain: theory and 
evidence do not yet provide much guidance on whether and how a given lending model 
will  produce  different  impacts  in  different  settings  (with  varying  demographics, 
competition, etc.). Our results do not derive the optimal lending model: we cannot say 
whether  a  different  lender  type,  product,  etc.  could  have  produced  better  (or  worse) 
impacts. The time horizon for measuring impacts varies across individuals and clusters: 
the maximum window from first offer of loans to follow-up is three years, but given a 
fast but staggered start, the typical community can accurately be described as having 
about two years of exposure to lending before the follow-up surveys were completed. 
II.  Background on the Lender, Loan Terms, and Study Setting 
A.  Compartamos and its Target Market 
The lender, Compartamos Banco, is the largest microlender in Mexico with 2.3 million 
borrowers.
5  Compartamos was founded in 1990 as a nonprofit organization, converted to 
a commercial bank in 2006, went public in 2007, and has a market capitalization of 
US$2.2 billion as of November  16
th, 2012. As of 2012, 71% of Compartamos clients 
borrow through Crédito Mujer, the group microloan product studied in this paper.   
 
Crédito Mujer nominally targets women that have a business or self-employment activity 
or intend to start one. Empirically, 100% of borrowers are women but we estimate that 
only about 51% are “microentrepreneurs”.
6  Borrowers tend to lack the income and/or 
collateral  required to  qualify for loans from  commercial  banks  and other “upmarket” 
lenders. Below we provide additional information on marketing, group formation, and 
screening. 
                                                 
5  According  to  Mix  Market,  http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/country/Mexico,  accessed  August 
22
nd, 2012. 
6  We define microenterpreneurshp here as currently or ever having owned a business, and use our 
endline survey data, including retrospective questions, to measure it. 5 
 
B.  Loan Terms 
Crédito Mujer loan amounts during most of the study range from M$1,500-M$27,000 
pesos (12 pesos, denoted M$, = $1US), with amounts for first-time borrowers ranging 
from M$1,500 - M$6,000 pesos ($125-$500 dollars) and larger amounts subsequently 
available to members of groups that have successfully repaid prior loans.
7  The mean loan 
amount in our sample is M$6,462 pesos, and the mean first loan is M$3,946 pesos. Loan 
repayments are due over 16 equal weekly installments, and are guaranteed by the group 
(i.e., joint liability). Aside from these personal guarantees there is no collateral.  Loans 
cost about 110% APR during our study period. For loans of this size, these rates are in the 
middle of the market   (nonprofits charge similar, sometimes higher , sometimes lower, 
rates than Compartamos).
8 
C.  Targeting, Marketing, Group Formation, and Screening 
Crédito Mujer groups range in size from 10 to 50 members. When Compartamos enters a 
new market,  as was the case in this study, loan officers typically  target self-reported 
female entrepreneurs and promote the Credito Mujer product through diverse channels, 
including  door-to-door  promotion,  distribution  of  fliers  in  public  places,  radio, 
promotional  events,  etc.  In  our  study,  Compartamos  conducted  only  door-to-door 
promotion in randomly assigned treatment areas (see Section III). As loan officers gain 
more clients in new areas, they promote less frequently and rely more on existing group 
members to recruit other members. 
 
When  a  group  of  about  five  women  –  half  of  the  minimum  required  group  size  – 
expresses  interest,  a  loan  officer  visits  the  partial  group  at  one  of  their  homes  or 
businesses to explain loan terms and process. These initial women are responsible for 
finding the rest of the group members. The loan officer returns for a second visit to 
explain loan terms in greater detail and complete loan applications for each individual. 
All potential members must be older than 18 years and also present a proof of address 
and valid identification to qualify for a loan. Business activities (or plans to start one) are 
not verified; rather, Compartamos relies on group members to screen out  poor credit 
risks. In equilibrium, potential members who express an interest and attend the meetings 
are rarely screened out by their fellow members, since individuals who would not get 
approved are neither approached nor seek out membership in the group. 
 
Compartamos reserves the right to reject any applicant put forth by the group but relies 
heavily on the  group’s  endorsement. Compartamos  does  pull a credit report for each 
individual and automatically rejects anyone with a history of fraud. Beyond that, loan 
officers  do  not  use  the  credit  bureau  information  to  reject  clients,  as  the  group  has 
responsibility for deciding who is allowed to join.   
 
                                                 
7  Also, beginning in weeks 3 to 9 of the second loan cycle, clients in good standing can take out 
an additional, individual liability loan, in an amount up to 30% of their joint liability loan. 
8  See http://blogs.cgdev.org/open_book/2011/02/compartamos-in-context.php for a more detailed 
elaboration of market interest rates in 2011 in Mexico. 6 
 
Applicants who pass Compartamos’ screens are invited to a loan authorization meeting. 
Each applicant must be guaranteed by every other member of the group to get a loan. 
Loan amounts must also be agreed upon unanimously. Loan officers moderate the group’s 
discussion,  and  sometimes  provide  information  on  credit  history  and  assessments  of 
individuals’ creditworthiness. Proceeds from authorized loans are disbursed as checks to 
each client.   
D.  Group Administration, Loan Repayment, and Collection Actions   
Each lending group decides where to meet, chooses the channel of repayment, creates a 
schedule  of  fines  for  late  payments,  and  elects  leadership  for  the  group,  including  a 
treasurer,  president,  and  secretary.  In  an  attempt  to  promote  group  solidarity, 
Compartamos  requires  groups  to  choose  a  name  for  themselves,  keep  a  plant  to 
symbolize their strength, and take a group pledge at the beginning of each loan. 
  
The treasurer collects payments from group members at each weekly meeting. The loan 
officer is  present  to  facilitate and monitor but does  not  touch the money.  If  a  group 
member does not make her weekly payment, the group president (and loan officer) will 
typically solicit and encourage “solidarity” pooling to cover the payment and keep the 
group  in  good  standing.  All  payments  are  placed  in  a  plastic  bag  that  Compartamos 
provides, and the treasurer then deposits the group’s payment at either a nearby bank 
branch or convenience store.
9 
  
Beyond the group liability, borrowers have several other incentives to repay. Members of 
groups with arrears are not eligible for another loan until the arrears are cured. Members 
of groups that remain in good standing qualify for larger subsequent loan amounts, and 
for  interest  rates  as  low  as  2.9%  monthly  (compared  to  3.89%  on  first  loans) .
10 
Compartamos also reports individual repayment history for each borrower to the Mexican 
Official Credit Bureau. Loans that are more than 90 days in arrears after the end of the 
loan term are sent to collection agencies. 
  
Compartamos trains all of its employees in an integrated model of personal development, 
known as FISEP. Under FISEP, Compartamos employees are encouraged to strive for six 
values in their physical, intellectual, social -familiar, spiritual, and professional lives. 
Loan officers share this philosophy with Compartamos clients to pro mote their personal 
development and help build group solidarity. Each client also receives a magazine from 
Compartamos with financial advice, tips for personal development, and entertainment. 
 
Late  payments  are  common   (Karlan  and  Zinman  (2013)  finds  a  90-day  group 
delinquency rate of 9.8%) but the ultimate default rate is only about 1%. 
                                                 
9  Compartamos has partnerships with six banks (and their convenience stores) and two separate 
convenience stores. The banks include Banamex (Banamexi Aquí), Bancomer (Pitico), Banorte 
(Telecomm and Seven Eleven), HSBC, Scotiabank, and Santander. The two separate convenience 
stores are Oxxo and Chedraui.   
10  To determine the exact interest rate, Compartamos considers the number of group members, 
punctuality, willingness to pay, and group seniority.  7 
 
E.  Study Setting: North-Central Sonora, 2009-2012 
We worked with Compartamos to identify an area of Mexico that it planned to enter but 
had not yet done so. The bank selected the north-central part of the State of Sonora: 
Nogales,  Caborca  and  Agua  Prieta  and  surrounding  towns.  The  study  area  borders 
Arizona to the north, and its largest city, Nogales (which is on the border), has about 
200,000 people. The area contains urban, peri-urban, and rural settlements. The study 
began in 2009, and concluded in 2012.   
 
To  understand  the  market  landscape,  we  examine  data  from  our  endline  survey. 
Respondents in the control group report having the majority of their loans (66% of all 
loan  funds)  from a bank  or  financial  institution,  including  other  microlenders.  The 
average size of all loans is 8,351 pesos, or roughly $696. The most prevalent lenders are 
all  considered  close  competitors  of  Compartamos:  Bancoppel  (12.1%,  5,001  pesos), 
Banco Azteca (9.3%, 6,776 pesos) and Financiera Independencia (5.4%, 4,918 pesos). 
Moneylenders (0.7%, 4,468 pesos) and pawnshops (0.4%, 2,065pesos) make up a small 
fraction of the market. Besides financial institutions, the other two prevalent sources are 
the government (8.4% of all loan funds, average size of 44,723 pesos) and trade credit 
(11.7%, 5,331 pesos). 
III.  Research Design, Implementation, and Data 
A.  Design Overview 
Our analysis uses a randomized cluster encouragement design, with randomization at the 
neighborhood- (urban areas) or municipality- (rural areas) level, and two sample frames. 
One sample frame, containing 33 clusters in the outlying areas of Nogales, has baseline 
and follow-up surveys. The second sample frame contains the remaining 205 clusters and 
has  just  follow-up  surveys.  Both  baseline  and  endline  surveys  were  administered  to 
potential borrowers—women 18 or older, who answered yes to any of three questions: (1) 
“Do you have an economic activity or a business? This can be, for example, the sale of a 
product  like  cosmetics,  clothes,  or  food,  either  through  a  catalogue,  from  a  physical 
location or from your home, or any activity for which you receive some kind of income”; 
(2) “If you had money to start an economic activity or a business, would you do so in the 
next year?”; (3) “If an institution were to offer you credit, would you consider taking it?”   
 
The endline survey was administered approximately 2-3 years after Compartamos’ entry, 
to 16,560 respondents. This constitutes our “Full Endline Sample”. The baseline survey 
was administered to 2,912 respondents in an area in which Compartamos had not yet 
expanded  about  one  year  following  its  initial  expansion  activities.  Combining  the 
baseline and endline produces the “Panel Sample” of 1,823 respondents. Figure 1 depicts 
the timeline of surveying and treatment.   
B.  Experimental Design and Implementation 
The research team divided the study area into 250 geographic clusters, with each cluster 
being a unit of randomization (see below for explanation of the reduction from 250 to 
238 clusters). In most urban areas, cluster boundaries are based on formal and informal 8 
 
neighborhood boundaries. Rural areas are more easily defined as an entire community. 
We then further grouped the 168 urban clusters (each of these 168 were located within the 
municipal boundaries of Nogales, Caborca, or Agua Prieta) into “superclusters” of four 
adjacent  clusters  each.
11 Then we randomized so that  125  clusters were assigned to 
receive direct promotion and access of Crédito Mujer (treatment group), while the other 
125 clusters would not receive any promotion or access until study data collection was 
completed (control group). This randomization was stratified on  superclusters for urban 
areas, and on branch offices in rural areas (one of three offices had primary responsibility 
for each cluster).
12 
 
Violence  prevented  both  Compartamos  and  IPA  surveyors  from  entering  some 
neighborhoods to promote loans and conduct surveys, respectively. We set up a decision 
rule that was agnostic to treatment status, and strictly determined by the survey team with 
respect to where they felt they could safely conduct surveys.  12 clusters were dropped 
(five treatment and  seven control). These are omitted from all analys es, and the final 
sample frame consists of 238 geographic clusters (120 treatment and 118 control). 
 
Table 1 verifies that our survey respondents are observably similar across treatment and 
control clusters. Columns 1-3 present summary statistics for the full sample using  data 
from the endline survey on variables unlikely to have changed due to treatment, such as 
age and  adult educational attainment.  Columns 4-6 present summary statistics for  the 
baseline  of  the  panel  sample,  for  a  larger  set  of  variables  (including  income  and 
preference measures). Columns  2  and  5  present tests  of orthogonality  between each 
variable and treatment status. We also report p-values from an F-test that all coefficients 
for the individual characteristics are zero  in  an OLS regression predicting treatment 
assignment presented in Columns 3 and 6 . Both tests pass: the p-values are 0.337 and 
0.222. 
 
Appendix Table 1 shows that, in the panel, attrition does not vary by treatment (Columns 
1-3). While attrition is not random, as the probability of being in the endline is positively 
correlated  with  age,  being  married,  and  prior  business  ownership,  and  negatively 
correlated  with  income  and  formal  account  ownership  (Column  2),  it  does  not 
systematically differ in control and treatment areas, as the p -value of the F-test of joint 
significance of the coefficients of the baseline variables interacted by treatment is 0.145 
(Column 3). 
 
Compartamos began operating in the 120 treatment clusters in April 2009, and follow-up 
surveys concluded during March 2012 (see below).  For  this three-year study period, 
Compartamos put in place an address verification step to require individuals to live in 
treatment areas in order to get loans, and only actively promoted its lending in treatment 
clusters. This led to an 18.9% take-up rate among those with completed endline surveys 
                                                 
11  In future work with Tim Conley, we plan to use these superclusters to estimate spillovers from 
treatment to control, by examining whether treatment versus control differences are smaller in 
high-intensity than low-intensity. 
12  In urban areas branches are completely nested in superclusters; i.e., any one supercluster is 
only served by one branch. 9 
 
in the treatment clusters, and a 5.8% take-up rate in the control clusters. All analysis will 
be intent-to-treat, on those surveyed, not just on those who borrowed in the treatment 
clusters. 
C.  Partial Baseline and Full Endline Survey 
After an initial failed attempt at a baseline survey in 2008,
13  we later capitalized on a 
delay in loan promotion rollout to 33 contiguous rural clusters (16 treatment and 17 
control), on the outskirts of Nogales, to do a baseline survey during the first half of 2010. 
For sampling, we established a targeted number of  respondents per cluster based on its 
estimated population of females above the ages of 18  (from Census data) who would 
have a high propensity to borrow from Compartamos if available: those who either had 
their own business, would want to start their own business in the following year, or would 
consider taking out a loan in the near future. Then we randomly sampled up to the target 
number in each cluster, for a total of 6,786 baseline surveys. Compartamos then entered 
these treatment clusters beginning in June 2010 (i.e., about a year after they entered the 
other  treatment  clusters).  Respondents  were  informed  that  the  survey  was  a 
comprehensive  socioeconomic  research  survey  being  conducted  by  a  nonprofit, 
nongovernmental organization (Innovations for Poverty Action) in collaboration with the 
University of Arizona (the home institution of one of the co -authors at the time of the 
survey). Neither the survey team nor the respondents were informed of the relationship 
between the researchers and Compartamos. 
 
The survey firm then conducted an endline survey between November 2011 and March 
2012. This timing produced an average exposure to Compartamos loan availability of 15 
months  in  the  clusters  with  baseline  surveys.  In  those  clusters,  we  tracked  2, 912 
respondents for endline follow up. In the clusters without baseline surveys, we followed 
the same sampling rules used in the baseline, and the average exposure to Compartamos 
loan availability was 28 months. In all, we have 16,560 completed endline surveys. We 
also have 1,823 respondents with both baseline and endline surveys. 
 
Our main sample is the full sample of endline respondents. Their characteristics are 
described in Table 1, Columns 1-2. Relative to the female Mexican population aged 18-
60, our sample has a similar age distribution (median 37), is more rural (27% vs. 22%) 
and married (75% vs. 63%), and has more occupants per household (4.6 vs. 3.9).
14  
D.  Who Borrows? 
Before estimating treatment effects of access to Compartamos credit, we provide some 
analysis of who borrows from Compartamos during our study period. Understanding the 
                                                 
13  We were unable to track baseline participants successfully, and in the process of tracking and 
auditing discovered too many irregularities by the survey firm to give us confidence in the data. It 
was not cost-effective to determine which observations were reliable, relative to spending further 
money on an expanded follow-up survey and new baseline survey in areas still untouched by 
Compartamos. Thus we decided to not use the first baseline for any analysis. 
14  Source; Instituto Nacional de Estadìstica y Geografìa. “Demografìa y Poblaciòn.” 2010. 
Accessed 22 March 2013 from http://www3.inegi.org.mx/. 10 
 
characteristics  of  borrowers  is  interesting  descriptively,  and  also  informs  the 
interpretation  of  treatment  effects.  We  measure  borrowing  using  Compartamos 
administrative data, merged with borrower characteristics measured by our surveys. Table 
2,  Panel  A  uses  the  entire  endline  sample  from  treatment  clusters.  The  mean  of  the 
dependent  variable (i.e., take-up in  the treatment  clusters) is  18.9% during the study 
period. The mean number of loans per borrower among treatment group members is 3.7 
(standard deviation of 3.05); 70% of borrowers in the treatment group borrowed more 
than  once  (Appendix  Figure  2).  The  endline  provides  a  large  sample  from  treatment 
areas, 8,262 observations, but contains only a few variables that are plausibly unaffected 
by treatment, i.e. unaffected by treatment. Of these variables, we observe that women 
who had prior businesses are more likely to borrow (by 9.6% percentage points), while 
those  with  tertiary  education  are  less  likely  to  borrow  than  those  with  primary  or 
secondary education only, and younger respondents (18-30) are less likely to borrow than 
middle-aged respondents (31-50). However, with these few variables we cannot predict 
much of the variation in the dependent variable: the adjusted R-squared is only 4.4%.   
 
We now turn to the panel sample, which is much smaller—682 observations in treatment 
areas—but allows us to consider a much broader set of baseline predictors of take-up. 
Take-up is lower in the panel, 11.9%, presumably at least in part due to the fact that the 
time elapsed between Compartamos’ entry and our endline is about 13 months less for the 
panel  sample  than  for  the  full  endline  sample  (recall  from  Section  III.C  that 
Compartamos entered the areas covered by our panel later). Table 2 Column 2a presents 
results  from  a  regression  of  take-up  (again  defined  as  borrowing  from  Compartamos 
during  our  study  period)  on  household  demographics,  income,  consumption,  assets, 
business characteristics, direct or indirect knowledge of and experience with formal credit 
institutions, and perceived likelihood of being eligible for formal loans. This rich set of 
regressors explains only a very small share of the variation in the dependent variable: the 
adjusted-R-squared  is  2.3%.
15  Therefore  we do not attempt to predict  take-up in the 
control group based on observable information.   
IV.  Identification and Estimation Strategies 
A.  Average Intent-to-Treat Effects 
We use survey data on outcomes to estimate the average effect of credit access, or the 
Average Intent to Treat (AIT) effect, with OLS equations of the form: 
 
(1) Yics =  + Tc + Xs + Zics + eics                 
   
                                                 
15  The bottom panel of Table 2 groups the regressors thematically and reports the partial adjusted 
R-squared and the p-value from an F-test for joint significance for each group. These results 
indicate that the strongest predictors of take-up are “credit expectations”: responses to questions 
about the likelihood of applying and being approved for a formal loan. If we omit these variables 
from  the  set  of take-up  predictors, the  adjusted  R-squared  drops  to  -1.4%,  that  is,  the  other 
variables basically explain none of the variation in take-up. Consistent with this finding, besides 
credit-related variables, the only other statistically significant predictor of take-up is education 
(tertiary education increases take-up likelihood). 11 
 
The variable Y is  an outcome, or summary index of outcomes,  following  Kling et al 
(2007) and Karlan and Zinman (2010), for person i in cluster c and supercluster s. We 
code Y’s so that higher values are more desirable (in a normative sense). Standard errors 
are clustered at the geographic cluster c level, as that is the unit of randomization. The 
Data  Appendix  details  the  survey  questions,  or  combinations  thereof  (for  summary 
indices),  that  we  use  to  measure  each  outcome.  T  is  a  binary  variable  that  is  1  if 
respondent i lives (“lives” defined as where she sleeps) in a treatment cluster c, and is 0 
otherwise; X is a vector of randomization strata (supercluster fixed effects, where the 
superclusters are nested in the bank branches), and Z is baseline value of the outcome 
measure, when available.
16   
 
The parameter  identifies the AIT effect under random assignment and absent spillover 
effects from treatment to control clusters (We are not aware of any prior studies with 
evidence of such spillovers).  is a useful policy parameter, because it estimates the effect 
of providing access to Credito Mujer.   
 
The AIT is a lower bound of the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) effect under the 
assumption that any within-cluster spillover effect on “non-compliers” (non-borrowers) is 
lower than any within-cluster spillover effect on “compliers” (people induced to borrow 
by the treatment). In the absence of within-cluster spillovers, one can estimate the ATT 
effect  on  Y  by  scaling  up  the  estimated  AIT  effect  on  Y  by  the  reciprocal  of  the 
differential compliance rate in treatment and control areas. In our setting this would lead 
to ATT point estimates that are about eight times larger than the AITs. 
B.  Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
Looking only at mean impacts may miss important heterogeneity in treatment effects, as 
discussed at the outset. So we examine heterogeneity using several methods, none of 
which require additional identification assumptions. 
B.1.  Distributions 
We start by testing whether the outcome variances are equal across treatment and control 
groups using a form of Levene’s test for clustered data (Iachine et al. 2010). Rejecting the 
null hypothesis of equality of variances indicates that treatment effects are heterogeneous. 
When we do reject equality of variances, we also test whether the observed heterogeneity 
of treatment effects is explained by observed characteristics. To establish this, we test for 
equality  of  variances  of  the  residuals  obtained  from  regressing  an  outcome  on  the 
treatment dummy, a set of predetermined variables measured at baseline (either socio-
economic variables only, or those plus proxies for risk and time preferences), and their 
interaction  with  the  treatment  dummy.  This  exercise  can  help  us  understand  the 
determinants of heterogeneity and predict which groups of people benefit or lose from 
treatment. 
 
Quantile  Treatment  Effects  (QTEs)  provide  further  insight  into  how  access  to 
Compartamos credit changes the shape of outcome distributions; e.g., whether most of 
                                                 
16  Adding controls for survey date does not change the results.   12 
 
the changes in outcomes between the treatment and control groups are in the tails, in the 
middle,  or  throughout  the  distribution.  QTEs  also  provide  some  information  on  the 
“winners and losers” question: if a QTE is negative (positive) for a given outcome in the 
tails, the treatment worsens (improves) that outcome for at least one household. But one 
cannot  infer  more  from  QTEs  about  how  many  people  gain  or  lose  without  further 
assumptions.
17  We  estimate  standard  errors  using  the  block -bootstrap  with  1000 
repetitions. 
B.2.  Winners and Losers? Average Intent to Treat Effects on Changes (Panel Only) 
Next,  we  examine  a  theoretical  and  policy  question  of  critical  interest:  are  there 
substantial numbers of people who are made worse off (as measured by one or more 
outcomes) by increased access to credit? We answer this question by using the panel data 
to estimate the average treatment effect on the likelihood that an outcome increases, or 
decreases, from baseline to follow up. We create two dummies for whether a person’s 
outcome increased or decreased from  baseline  to  endline. We separately  estimate the 
treatment  effects  on  the  probability  of  improving  (relative  to  not  improving),  and  of 
worsening (relative to not worsening) by logit. Recall, however, that have panel data on 
only about 11% of our sample and for a subset of outcomes.   
B.3.  Who Wins and Who Loses? Heterogeneous AITs 
Another method for addressing the winners and losers question is to estimate AITs for 
sub-groups  of  households.  Note  that  there  may  substantial  impact  heterogeneity  also 
within subgroups.. We do this with a modified version of equation (1): 
 
(2) Yic = a + 
1Tc*Si
1 + 
Tc*Si
0 + Si
1
 + Xs + Zics + eics           
       
Where 
1 and 
2 are the coefficients of interest, and Si is a single baseline characteristic 
separated into two sub-groups; e.g., prior business owner (Si
1) or not (Si
0). As with the 
main AIT estimates, standard errors are clustered at the geographic cluster c level, as that 
is the unit of randomization. We estimate (2) rather than putting several Si into the same 
equation  because  we  are  particularly  interested  in  whether  there  are  potentially 
identifiable sub-groups that experience adverse treatment effects, and who hence might 
merit further scrutiny by microlenders or policymakers going forward (e.g., screened out, 
                                                 
17  The QTEs are conceptually different than the effect of the treatment at different quantiles. That 
is, QTEs do not necessarily tell us by how much specific households gain or lose from living in 
treatment clusters. For example: say we find that business profits increase at the 25
th percentile in 
treatment relative to control. This could be because the treatment shifts the distribution rightward 
around the 25
th percentile, with some business owners doing better and no one doing worse. But it 
also could be the result of some people doing better around the 25
th percentile while others do 
worse (by a bit less in absolute value); this would produce the observed increase at the 25
th 
percentile while also reshuffling ranks. More formally, rank invariance is required for QTEs to 
identify  the  effect  of  the  treatment  for  the  household  at  the  qth  quantile  of  the  outcome 
distribution.    Under  rank  invariance,  the  QTEs  identify  the  treatment  effects  at  a  particular 
quantile. However, rank invariance seems implausible in our setting; e.g., effects on borrowers 
are likely larger (in absolute value) than effects on non-borrowers. 13 
 
or  subjected  to  different  underwriting)
18.  We  examine  Si  that  have  been  deemed 
interesting  by  theory,  policy,  and/or  prior  work:  prior  business  ownership,  education, 
urban location, income level, prior formal credit experience, prior formal bank account 
experience, and prior informal savings group experience. Data for four of these seven Si 
come from the baseline survey, and for these characteristics we can estimate (2) only for 
the subset of individuals in our panel. We also examine heterogeneity with respect to 
preferences (risk aversion, time inconsistency and patience). These Si are only available 
for the panel sample frame, and also yield more speculative inferences as the questions in 
the survey are likely noisy measures of the underlying parameters of interest. 
C.  Dealing with Multiple Outcomes 
We consider multiple outcomes, some of which belong to the same “family” in the sense 
that they proxy for some broader outcome or channel of impact (e.g., we have several 
outcomes that one could think of as proxies for business size: number of employees, 
revenues, expenditures, and profits). This creates multiple inference problems that we 
deal with in two ways. For an outcome family where we are not especially interested in 
impacts on particular variables, we create an index—a standardized average across each 
outcome in the family—and test whether the overall effect of the treatment on the index 
is zero (see Kling et al (2007)). For outcome variables that are interesting in their own 
right  but  plausibly  belong  to  the  same  family,  we  calculate  adjusted  critical  values 
following the approach introduced by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995).
19  In such cases 
we report whether the outcome is significant using  their procedure. The unadjusted p-
value is most useful for making inferences about the treatment effect on a particular 
outcome. The  adjusted critical levels are most useful for making inferences about the 
treatment effect on a family of outcomes. 
V.  Results 
In tracking our results please keep in mind that sample sizes vary across different 
analyses for several reasons: using the panel sample only, using sub-samples conditioned 
on the relevance of a particular outcome (e.g, decision power questions were only asked 
of married respondents living with another adult), and item non-response. Appendix 
Table 3 provides additional details. 
A.    Average Intent-to-Treat Effects 
Figure 2 summarizes results obtained from estimating equation (1) separately for each 
outcome. Panel A in each of Tables 3-7 provides more details on the results. We group 
outcomes thematically. 
                                                 
18  However, we also estimate a version of equation 2 in which we add all the subgroups - and 
their interaction with the treatment dummy - in the right hand side 
19  An alternative approach is to calculate adjusted p-values following Aker et al (2011). We 
calculate both and find nearly identical results.   14 
 
A.1.  Credit and Other Financial Services 
Table 3 Panel A and the top panel of Figure 2 present AIT estimates on credit and other 
financial services. These outcomes provide a sort of “1
st-stage” underlying any impacts 
on more ultimate impacts like business performance, household income, and well-being. 
 
As noted above, strong compliance with the experimental design produced more lending 
in treatment (18.9% reporting taking a loan from Compartamos) than control clusters 
(5.8%). Column 1 shows that the treatment group has 0.121 (se=0.035) more loans on 
average in the past two years than the control group, and Column 2 shows an increase in 
the total amount borrowed ($M1248 more, se=$M471).
20  Columns 3 and 4 show the 
analogous results for Compartamos borrowing  (see also Appendix Figure 2 for more 
detail on treatment group borrowing);
21  comparing these to the total borrowing effects 
we find no evidence of crowd-out and some suggestion of crowd-in on amount borrowed. 
Columns 5 and 6 show imprecisely estimated null effects on informal borrowing.
22  All 
told, these results  suggest that there was little substitution of Compartamos loans for 
other debt. 
 
Next we examine several other indicators of financial access. Column  7 shows that the 
increase in formal sector borrowing does not increase the likelihood that someone would 
go to a formal source if they needed a $M6,000 loan tomorrow (although it does increase 
the  perceived  likelihood  of  getting  the  loan),
23  and  Column  8  shows  that  overall 
satisfaction with access to financial services has not changed (point estimate =  -0.005, 
se=0.012, dependent variable is binary for being satisfied). Column 9 shows a significant 
negative effect of 1.9 percentage points on participation in an informal savings group, on 
a base of 22.8%.
24  We lack data that directly addresses whether this reduction is by 
choice or constraint (where constraints could bind if increa sed formal access disrupts 
informal networks), but the overall pattern of results is more consistent with choice: there 
                                                 
20  All of the loan counts and loan amounts are right-skewed, so we re-estimate after top-coding 
each at the 99% percentile. The estimates remain statistically significant with >99% confidence. 
21  Results  are  similar  if  we  use  Compartamos’  administrative  data  instead  of  survey  data  to 
measure Compartamos borrowing.  Interestingly, we find less underreporting of Compartamos 
borrowing than in a comparable study in South Africa (Karlan and Zinman 2008). Here 22% of 
borrowers who we know, from administrative data, to have borrowed from Compartamos during 
the previous two years report no borrowing from Compartamos over the previous two years. 
22  Note that the (self -reported) prevalence of such borrowing is quite low relative   to formal 
sources; e.g., less than 3% of the sample reports any use of moneylenders or pawnshops among 
their last 3 loans. We did prompt specifically for specific lender types, including moneylenders 
and pawnshops, so the low prevalence of informal borrowing in our sample is not simply due to 
respondent (mis)conceptions that money owed to these sources is not a “loan”. 
23  The effect on the likelihood that someone would go to an informal source is also not 
significant. But we do find a reduction in the likel ihood of expected problems with getting the 
$M6,000 loan: 0.04 percentage points on a base of 0.21. Taken together, these results suggest that 
the presence of Compartamos increases option value on the intensive but not extensive margin: it 
does not change, e.g., whether someone is (primarily) a formal or informal sector borrower, but it 
does increase the overall amount of credit one can access. 
24  We do not find a significant effect on the likelihood of having a bank account. 15 
 
is no effect on the ability to get credit from friends or family in an emergency (results not 
shown in table), and a positive effect on trust in people (Table 7, to be discussed below). 
 
In all, the results in Table 3 show that Compartamos’ expansion increased household 
borrowing  from  Compartamos  and  borrowing  overall,  decreased  the  use  of  informal 
savings groups (likely by choice not by constraint), but did not shift satisfaction with 
financial services.   
A.2.  Business Outcomes 
Table 4 Panel A and the second panel of Figure 2 present AIT estimates of impacts on 
some key business outcomes. Columns 1 and 2 show null effects on business ownership: 
current and ever (-0.4 percentage points and -0.1 percentage points, both se’s=0.9, means 
in control groups are 0.24 and 0.39).
25  Column 3 reports a 0.8 percentage point increase 
(se=0.4, control mean 0.05) on using loan proceeds to grow a business.   
 
Turning to various measures of business size,  Column  4  shows a null effect on the 
number of employees (0.003, se = 0.010). Note that having any employees is rare –only 
9% of households in the control group have a business with any employees. Columns 5-6 
show  that  revenues  and  expenditures  over  the  past  two  weeks  increase  by  similar 
amounts (M$121 and M$118, which are 27% and 36% of the control group means). 
Columns 7 and 8 show imprecisely estimated null effects on profits, whether measured as 
revenues minus expenditures (Column 7) or in response to “How much business income 
did you earn?” (de Mel et al (2009)). Adjusting the critical levels for these results, under 
the assumption that the outcomes in Columns 4-8 all belong to the same family (e.g., 
business size), does not change the significance of the coefficients.  These results are 
consistent  with  Column  3,  which  finds  a  significant  positive  treatment  effect  on  the 
likelihood of ever having used a loan to grow a business. 
 
Column 9 shows positive but not statistically significant evidence that the loans helped 
people manage risk: specifically, an increase of 0.7 percentage points (se=0.5) in the 
likelihood that the business did not experience financial problems in the past year (note 
this could be a direct effect of increased access to credit if failure to get access to credit is 
itself deemed a financial problem). 
 
In all, the results on business outcomes suggest that expanded credit access increased the 
size of some existing businesses. But we do not find effects on business ownership or 
profits. 
A.3.  Household Consumption and Expenditures 
Table  5,  and  the  third  panel  of  Figure  2,  report  AITs  on  measures  of  household 
consumption and expenditures over various horizons. In theory, treatment effects on these 
                                                 
25  Respondents identified whether they currently had a business by responding to the following 
prompt: “How many businesses or economic activities do you currently have? It can be, for 
example, the sale of a product or food, either through catalogue, in an establishment or in your 
home.” We find a similar result on the number of businesses owned (not shown in table); this is 
not surprising given that fewer than 10% of owners have multiple businesses. 16 
 
variables could go in either direction. Loan access might increase expenditures through at 
least two channels. One is consumption smoothing. A second is income-generation that 
leads to higher overall spending; although we do not find an effect on business profits or 
income in Table 4 (or on other income sources, reported in Table 6), it is important to 
keep in mind that any single measure of income or wealth is likely to be noisy. So one 
might detect (income) effects on spending even in the absence of detecting effects on 
income itself. On the other hand, loan access might lead to declines in our spending 
variables  if  loans  primarily  finance  short-term  consumption  smoothing  or  durable 
purchases  that  must  then  be  repaid,  with  interest,  at  the  expense  of  longer-term 
consumption. Also, if people “overborrow” on average, making bad investments (broadly 
defined) with the loan proceeds, then spending might need to fall to cover losses on these 
investments. 
 
The first two columns of Table 5 present estimated effects on uses of loan proceeds (also 
recall  the  result from  Table 4 Column 3 showing a  significant  impact  on using loan 
proceeds to grow a business). Column 1 shows a positive effect on the likelihood that 
someone did not sell an asset to help pay for a loan; i.e., this result suggests that increased 
credit access reduces the likelihood of costly “fire sales” by one percentage point (se=0.4 
percentage points), a 20% reduction. This is a striking result, since the positive treatment 
effect on debt mechanically pushes against a reduction in fire sales (more debt leads to 
greater likelihood of needing to sell an asset to pay off debt, all else equal). Also, given 
that such sales are low-prevalence (only 4.9% of households in the 2 years prior to the 
endline), they may be practices that people resort to in extreme circumstances. In this 
case,  the  treatment  might  be  beneficial  for  people  in  people  considerable  financial 
distress. We do not find a significant effect on using loans for asset purchases (column 2). 
 
Columns 3-10 present results for eight expenditure categories. Groceries and hunger are 
not affected by the treatment, which is not surprising, given that our sample is generally 
not poor. The two statistically significant effects—reductions in temptation goods and 
asset purchases—do not survive adjusting the critical values under the assumption that 
the eight expenditure categories belong to the same outcome family. 
 
One of the individually significant results (Column 3) is a 6% reduction in temptation 
goods (cigarettes, sweets, and soda); Banerjee et al (2009) attribute their similar finding 
to  household  budget  tightening  required  to  service  debt  (i.e.,  temptation  spending  is 
relatively  elastic  with  respect  to  the  shadow  value  of  liquidity).  An  alternative 
explanation is that female empowerment (discussed below in Table 7) leads to reduced 
spending on unhealthy items.     
 
The other individually significant result is a five percentage point (10%) reduction in 
durable  assets  purchased  in  the  past  two  years  (Column  8).
26  In  tandem  with  the 
reduction in asset sales to pay off a loan (Column 1), this result could be interpreted as a 
reduction in asset “churn.” If secondary markets yield relatively low prices (due, e.g., to a 
                                                 
26  Our survey instrument did not ask in detail about the value of assets bought and sold unless 
they were bought or sold in relation to a loan. Consequently, we report the counts of assets here 
instead of their values. 17 
 
lemons problem), then reduced churn could actually be welfare-improving. Note however 
that we do not find a treatment effect on a broader measure of asset sales than the debt 
service-motivated one in Column 1: Column 9 shows an imprecisely estimated increase 
in the likelihood that the household did not sell an asset over the previous two years 
(0.007, se=0.007).   
A.4.  Household Income and Saving 
Table 6, and the top part of the “Income and Consumption” panel in Figure 2, examines 
additional measures of income: total household income, labor income, participation in 
any economic activity, remittance income, and positive saving in the last six months. The 
motivation  for  examining  these  measures  is  twofold.  Methodologically,  as  discussed 
above, any individual measure of income, wealth, or economic activity is likely to be 
noisy, so it is useful to examine various measures. Substantively, there is prior evidence 
of  microloan  access  increasing  job  retention  and  wage  income  (Karlan  and  Zinman 
2010),  and  speculation  that  credit  access  might  be  used  to  finance  investments  in 
migration or immigration (that pay off in the form of remittances, e.g.).
27 
 
We do not find significant effects on any of the five measures. Most of the estimates are 
fairly precise: the only confidence interval containing effect sizes that would be large 
relative to the control group mean is remittance income.   
A.5.  Welfare 
Table 7 reports AITs on various measures of welfare. We start with perhaps the most 
important, a measure of depression,
28  where we estimate a 0.045 (se=0.024) standard 
deviation increase in happiness (i.e., the absence of signs of depression). Job stress, locus 
of control, and trust in institutions are unaffected, and the upper ends of these confidence 
intervals contain effects that are only +/ - 0.06 standard deviations (Columns 2 -4). An 
index of trust in people (family, neighbors, personal acquaintances, people just met, 
business  acquaintances,  borrowers,  and  strangers)  increases   by  an  estimated  0.05 
standard deviations (se=0.027). This could be a by-product of the group aspect of the 
lending product. Satisfaction with one’s life and harmony with others, and with economic 
situation,  are  unaffected  on  average  (Columns  6  and  7).  There  is  a  small  but  nearly 
significant positive effect on physical health status: a one percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of self-reporting good or better health, on a base of 0.78, with a p-value of 0.13 
(Column 8). The point estimate on the proportion of children not working is also small 
and positive: 0.007, on a base of 0.915 among the sample of households with a school-
aged child, with a p-value of 0.24. 
                                                 
27  The treatment effect  on a  more  direct  measure of  out-migration—whether  anyone  left  the 
household for work in the last 2 years without returning —is .002, se= .003. 
28  The depression measure is an index of responses to questions about the incidence of the 
following: being bothered by things that do not normally bother you, having a poor appetite, not 
being able to shake off the blues even with support from friends and family, feeling just as good 
as other people, having trouble focusing, feeling depressed, feeling like everything required extra 
effort, being hopeful about the future, thinking your life was a failure, feeling fearful, having 
restless  sleep,  feeling  happy,  talking  less  than  usual,  being  lonely,  thinking  people  were 
unfriendly, having crying spe lls, enjoying life, feeling sad, thinking people dislike you,  and 
feeling like you couldn’t keep going on. 18 
 
 
The last three columns (10-12) show effects on the respondent’s intrahousehold decision 
making power, for the subsample of women who are not single and not the only adult in 
their household (recall that all survey respondents are women).
29  These are key outcomes 
given the strong claims (by, e.g., financial institutions, donors, and policymakers) that 
microcredit  empowers  women  by  giving  them  greater  access  to  resources  and  a 
supportive group environment  (Hashemi et al 1996; Kabeer 1999). On the other hand, 
there is evidence that large increases in the share of household reso urces controlled by 
women threatens the identity of some men  (Maldonado et al 2002), causing increases in 
domestic violence  (Angelucci 2008).  Column 10 shows an   increase on the extensive 
margin  of  household  financial  decision  making :  treatment  group  women  are  0.8 
percentage points more likely to have any  say. This is a large proportional effect on the 
left  tail—i.e.,  on  extremely  low-power  women—since  97.5%  of  control  group 
respondents say they participate in any financial decision making; this effect represents 
an improvement for almost one third of the 2.5% of respondents that otherwise had no 
financial  decision  making.  Column  11  shows  a  small  but  significant  increase  in  the 
number of issues for which the woman has any say: 0.07 (se=0.03) on a base of 2.78. 
Both Column 10 and Column 11 show significant effects after adjustment for multiple 
hypothesis  testing.  Column  12  shows  no  increase  in  the  amount  of  intra-household 
conflict. Note the expected sign of the treatment effect on this  final outcome and its 
interpretation is ambiguous: less conflict is more desirable all else equal, but all else may 
not be equal in the sense that greater decision power could produce more conflict. In 
practice we find little evidence of any treatment effects on the amount of intra-household 
conflict. 
 
In all, the results in this table paint a generally positive picture of the average impacts of 
expanded credit access on well-being: depression falls, trust in others rises, and female 
household decision power increases.   
A.6.  Big Picture 
Viewing the average treatment effect results holistically, using Figure 2, we can draw four 
broad conclusions. First, increasing access to microcredit increases borrowing and does 
not  crowd-out  other  loans.  Second,  loans  seem  to  be  used  for  both  investment—in 
particular for expanding previously existing businesses—and for risk management. Third, 
there is evidence of positive average impacts on business size, avoiding fire sales, lack of 
depression, trust, and female decision making. Fourth, there is little evidence of negative 
average impacts: we find only three statistically significant negative treatment effects on 
individual outcomes, out of 45 outcomes. Moreover, each of the three “negative” results 
                                                 
29  The dependent variable in column 10, “Participates in any financial decisions,” is a binary 
variable equal to one if the respondent participates in at least one of the household financial 
decisions, and equal to zero if she participates in none of the decisions. The dependent variable in 
column 11, “# of household decisions she has a say on,” represents the number of household 
issues (of four) that the respondent either makes alone, or has some say on when a disagreement 
arises if she makes the decision jointly. The dependent variable in column 12, the “# of household 
issues in which a conflict arises,” represents the number of household issues (of four) in which a 
disagreement sometimes arises if the respondent makes the decision jointly.     19 
 
actually has a normatively positive or neutral interpretation, as discussed above, and two 
of  them  lose  statistical  significance  with  the  family-wise  correction  for  multiple 
hypothesis testing. 
B.  Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
B.1.  Distributions 
We first test the hypothesis of common treatment effects on borrowers and non-borrowers 
by comparing the standard deviations in treatment and control groups: these two standard 
deviations are identical under the null of constant treatment effects. We reject this null 
hypothesis  for  9  of  the  10  continuous  outcomes  for  which  we  detect  statistically 
significant AITs in Tables 3-7. (Results reported in the bottom rows of Panel A for each of 
Tables 3-7. We do not test binary outcomes and do not have any categorical outcomes.) 
Moreover, we find that loan access significantly changes the standard deviations for 6 out 
of the 19 continuous outcomes whose means do not change significantly. The prevalence 
of treatment effects on standard deviations is evidence of heterogeneous effects. In these 
15 outcomes where the standard deviation differs, it increases under treatment compared 
to control in 8, and decreases in 7. If the treatment causes a decrease in outcome variance, 
there is a negative correlation between impact size and the outcome in the absence of the 
treatment (see Appendix 1). Adjustment for multiple hypothesis testing does not change 
any of these results. 
 
Next  we use the panel  data to test  whether the variance treatment  effects  are driven 
entirely by the characteristics we can observe, by comparing the variances of treatment 
versus  control  residuals  obtained  from  regressing  outcomes  on  treatment  assignment, 
baseline  characteristics,  and  interactions  between  these  characteristics  and  treatment 
assignment. The “apples-to-apples” comparisons here are between the “panel only” row 
and  the  “residuals”  rows.  Controlling  for  our  observables  eliminates  the  statistically 
significant treatment effect on standard deviation in only 1 of the 15 cases. In three of the 
14  cases  without  a  statistically  significant  effect  in  the  panel  sample  controlling  for 
observables actually generates statistical significance (for profits and household business 
income), both with and without adjustment for multiple hypothesis testing. These results 
suggest that heterogeneous treatment effects are not readily explained by observables, 
and implies that treatment effects likely vary even within the subgroups we examine in 
Section V.B.3. 
 
Figure 3 shows QTE estimates for number of employees, revenues, expenditures, and 
profits. These are all conditional on business ownership, since Table 4 finds no treatment 
effects  on  ownership.  For  businesses  with  any  employees,  treatment  decreases  the 
likelihood of 1 employee but increases the likelihood of having 3 employees. Revenues, 
expenditures,  profits,  and  business  income  each  appear  to  increase  in  the  right  tail 
(Figures 3c to 3f), although the increases in expenditures are not statistically significant at 
the estimated percentiles. In addition, profits also fall at low percentiles (although the left 
tail effects are not statistically significant), hinting that the treatment might cause profit 
losses to some. In all, the results on business outcomes indicate that expanded credit 
access increases business size and profitability to the right of the median. 
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Figure 4 presents the QTEs we could estimate for the continuous expenditure outcomes 
in Table 5. Although most individual QTEs are not statistically significant, the overall 
pattern suggests right-tail increases in several spending categories. Treated households 
are more likely to have bought zero new assets, and very nearly less likely to have bought 
any  of  the  non-zero  asset  counts.  This  is  consistent  with  the  previously  documented 
reduction in fire sales of assets.   
 
Figure 5 shows QTE estimates for two of the three continuous measures of income used 
in Table 6. Many of these QTE estimates are imprecise, and none is significantly different 
from zero at the estimated percentiles. Remittances are not included in the QTE graphs 
because fewer than five percent receive any remittances.   
 
Figure 6 shows QTE estimates for eight of the nine continuous outcomes measures used 
in Table 7 (the QTE estimates for children working did not converge). The depression 
index improves throughout the entire distribution, with larger point estimates to the left of 
the median (Figure 6a). QTEs for trust in people show a similar pattern, although only 
one of the individual QTEs is statistically significant (Figure 6e). We find no strong 
patterns  for  the  stress,  control,  or  institutional  trust  indices  (Figures  65.b  to  65.d), 
although  there  is  a  negative  effect  on  locus  of  control  at  the  5th  percentile,  which 
confirms the possibility of some people being negatively affected by the treatment. The 
point estimates for the satisfaction and harmony index are all zero (and often precisely 
estimated), excepting a significant increase at the 75
th percentile (Figure 6f). Likewise, 
the two decision power variables show mostly precise zeros at each number of issues, 
with the exception of statistically significant increase for the likelihood of having say on 
all four household issues asked about (Figure 6g).   
 
Overall, we glean three key patterns from the QTE estimates. First, there are several 
variables with positive treatment effects in the right tail: revenues, expenses, profits, and 
school/medical  expenses  (and several  of the other expenditure categories  have nearly 
significant positive QTEs at the 90
th percentile or above). Second, we see positive effects 
on  depression  and  trust  throughout  their  distributions.  Third,  there  are  few  hints  of 
negative impacts in the left tail of distributions—with the exception of profits and locus 
of  control—alleviating  concerns  that  expanded  credit  access  might  adversely  impact 
people with the worst baseline outcomes. However, as we discussed above, the results 
thus far tell us relatively little about whether and to what extent distributional changes 
produced winners and losers. We now turn to two additional sets of analyses that help us 
understand if the treatment creates winners and losers.   
B.2.  Winners and Losers? Average Intent to Treat Effects on Changes (Panel Only) 
We start by estimating treatment effects on likelihoods of outcomes increasing, and of 
outcomes declining, from baseline to follow-up. These results are presented in Panels B 
and C of Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, corresponding to the AIT endline estimates in the Panel 
A’s  of  those  same  tables.  We  estimate  these  effects  using  logits,  for  the  subset  of 
outcomes and respondents with panel data. Given the typically positive average treatment 
effects,  we  are  particularly  interested  in  treatment  effects  on  the  likelihood  that  an 
outcome worsens over time, in order to examine whether the AIT is masking important 
dispersion. 21 
 
 
 
Before discussing the results on increases and decreases in detail, we pause to examine 
the internal and external validity of the panel sample. As discussed earlier, presence in the 
panel  is  uncorrelated  with  treatment  status,  supporting  internal  validity.  The  external 
validity of the panel is more subjective. We have panel data on only about 11% of our full 
sample, and the panel sample represents 33 of 238 clusters in our full sample. The smaller 
sample and cluster count also reduce our power. Appendix Figure 1 summarizes AITs for 
the panel sample, in order to compare the AIT’s on just the panel to the AITs for the full 
endline.  Two  key  patterns  emerge.  First,  we  find  only  three  significantly  different 
treatment effects from the full sample, although this lack of significant differences is due 
in  large  part  to  large  confidence  intervals  (for  the  panel  sample  treatment  effects  in 
particular). Second, although the remaining differences are not statistically significant, 
the overall pattern of results for the panel is less positive than for the full sample. 
 
With the above caveats in mind, we now return to Tables 3-7. We have a limited set of 
variables collected both at baseline and endline. For credit activity (Table 3), there is no 
statistical evidence that access to Credito Mujer crowds out loans from money lenders 
and pawnshops (Panel C), or changes the likelihood of membership in informal savings 
groups.   
 
For  the  more  ultimate  outcomes,  the  general  picture  is  weakly  positive,  and  hence 
consistent  with  the  AITs  in  the  Panel  A’s.  Table  4  shows  no  significant  effects  on 
likelihoods  of  business  ownership  increasing  or  decreasing  (Columns  1  and  2).  The 
likelihood of using a loan to grow a business is more likely to increase in the treatment 
group  (0.016  on  a  base  of  0.040,  se=0.009),  and  no  more  likely  to  decrease  (0.001, 
se=0.006). There is no evidence that businesses shrink or get less profitable (Columns 4-
8, Panel C). Indeed, the likelihoods of having a larger number of employees (Column 4) 
and a higher business income (Column 8) go up by 7 and 6 percent compared to the 
changes  in  the control  group, although only the former is  significant  at  conventional 
levels  (and  not  significant  after  adjustment  for  multiple  hypothesis  testing).  Besides 
business  income,  we  have  panel  data  for  two  other  income  sources:  total  household 
income and remittances (Table 6). Neither of these sources is more likely to decline in 
treatment areas (Panel C), and the treatment effect on the likelihood of remittance income 
increasing  is  positive  (0.017  on  a  base  of  0.027,  se=0.010),  but  not  significant  after 
adjustment. Table 7 Panel C shows no ill-effects on any of available welfare measures 
(depression index, health status, child labor). Panel B shows a 2.6 percentage point (se = 
1.5) increase in the likelihood of better health, on a base of 0.11. 
 
In sum,  this  analysis from  the panel  data  shows some evidence that expanded credit 
access increases the likelihood of outcomes improving over the treatment horizon, and no 
evidence of treatment effects on the likelihood of outcomes declining. I.e., we do not find 
any evidence here that Credito Mujer makes outcomes worse over time. 
B.3.  Who Wins and Who Loses? Heterogeneous AITs 
Next we examine whether any of 20 sub-groups experience negative treatment effects. 
We  organize  the  analyses  by  heterogeneity  in  socioeconomic  characteristics  and  in 22 
 
preferences. Socioeconomic status is readily observed by lenders, other service providers, 
regulators, etc., so documenting any systematically negative or positive treatment effects 
for  specific  sub-groups  provides  guidance  for  screening  and  targeting  microcredit. 
Preferences  are  more  difficult  to  observe  and  measure  accurately,  but  understanding 
whether  and  how  the  effects  of  access  to  credit  vary  with  proxies  for  risk  and  time 
preferences can shed light on how prospective borrowers are deciding whether and how 
much to borrow. 
 
The sub-group analyses are summarized in Table 8, with more detail provided in Figures 
7-13 for the socioeconomic variables, and Figures 14-16 for the preference variables. The 
Figures  show  effect  sizes  in  standard deviation  units  for all outcomes  except  for the 
borrowing outcomes on number of loans. The effect sizes on these three variables are not 
scaled (i.e., the units are number of loans), because for these we are primarily interested 
in the magnitude of the “first-stage”, including the extent of any crowd-out of other loan 
sources by Compartamos borrowing. 
 
We focus our discussion, as before, on whether there are statistically significant positive 
and/or negative impacts on our various outcomes. In addition, we check whether there are 
differential  impacts  for  mutually  exclusive  subgroups.  When  considering  these 
differential impacts, one should keep in mind that if there are differential take-up rates by 
subgroup the estimated AITs may be statistically different for a pair of subgroups even if 
the actual average treatment effects are the same for borrowers and non-borrowers in 
those groups. The take-up rates are statistically different for women without and with 
prior business ownership (16.3% and 25.4%) and formal credit experience (10.5% and 
15.4%). This is not an issue, however, when the signs of the two AITs differ.   
 
Table 8 provides counts of positive and negative significant treatment effects for each of 
the 20 sub-groups, and of significant differences in treatment effects and their direction 
within the 10 groups. We use adjusted critical levels for these counts; Figures 7-16 also 
show when the adjustment causes a treatment effect that is significant without adjustment 
to become not significant.    We focus often on the “Totals” (Columns 9 and 10), which 
sum across categories of the 34 ultimate outcomes of interest: business (9 outcomes), 
income and consumption (14 outcomes), and other welfare (11 outcomes). We count each 
of  these  outcomes  individually,  with  two  exceptions.  First,  we  exclude  spending  on 
temptation  goods  and  the  number  of  issues  with  conflict,  because  the  normative 
interpretation  of  any  treatment  effects  on  these  outcomes  is  especially  difficult  (see 
discussion in Section V.A). Second, we combine information on overall asset sales and 
purchases,  since  sales  may  somewhat  mechanically  induce  subsequent 
purchases. Specifically, if asset sales and purchases each fall for a given sub-group, we 
count this as a single, positive treatment effect in the Total. In all, this means that our 
summary counts allow for a maximum of 34 significant treatment effects for each sub-
group, and a minimum of zero.   
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Socio-economic variables using the full sample 
Prior business ownership 
First, we examine treatment effects for prior business owners versus non-prior business 
owners, using two retrospective questions from the endline data on business ownership 
prior to treatment. 24% of the sample owned a business prior to treatment. We find a 
strong first stage for this sub-group (Figure 7.a), and positive effects on several business 
outcomes and on total household income, and positive effects on trust in people and the 
extensive  margin  of  household  decision  making.  All  told  there  are  8  or  9  positive 
treatment effects, depending on whether we use adjusted critical levels. (Below and Table 
8 focuses on adjusted  critical  values, but  Figures  7-16 show both).  The two  (nearly) 
significant  negative  effects  (on  informal  savings  and  asset  purchases)  are  actually 
consistent with improvement in financial resiliency and risk management; as discussed 
above, we consider these potentially “good” outcomes from a policy perspective. 
 
The picture is less uniformly sanguine for the non-business owner sub-group (Figure 7.b), 
but still positive. This group also has a strong first stage. Effects on business outcomes 
are  not  significant,  and  several  are  statistically  significantly  lower  than  for  business 
owners (Figure 7.c). However, this may simply be caused by the lower take-up rate for 
this subgroup. There is a nearly significant reduction in the likelihood of working in the 
last 30 days, and this treatment effect is significantly lower for non-business owners than 
business owners. On the other hand, non-business owners in treatment areas have fewer 
asset sales for debt service, less depression, and more decision power. On balance, the 
results suggest that non-business owners use the loans to pay off more expensive debt, 
work less, and are happier for it. We cannot rule out some negative effects on this sub-
group, but the pattern does not suggest clear welfare reductions. 
Education 
We measure education using endline data, despite the fact that it could in principle be 
affected  by  credit  access  (in  practice,  adults  returning  to  school  in  Mexico  is  rare), 
because we find no effects of treatment assignment on educational attainment. The sub-
group with relatively high-education (the 71% of the sample > primary school) fares 
pretty  well  (Figure  8.a).  We  see  increases  in  business  revenues  and  expenditures,  a 
reduction  in  asset  sales  to  pay  loans,  and  a  nearly  significant  reduction  in  financial 
problems with the business (p-value = 0.11). Depression falls and decision power rises. 
The one somewhat worrisome treatment effect is that home improvements fall (and are 
significantly  below  the  low-education  sub-group).  But  overall  we  can  rule  out 
systematically  negative  effects  on  the  relatively  high-education  sub-group,  and 
furthermore the treatment effects mirror those of the average treatment effects for the full 
sample. 
 
The low-education sub-group (the 29% of the sample with primary school or less) does 
not  have  any  significant  treatment  effects  among  the  34  outcomes  we  count  as 
normatively  interesting.  The  first  stage  is  strong  (Figure  8.b),  but  all  of  the  point 
estimates on business outcomes are clustered around zero. There is a bit of evidence that 
household income (in particular from wage labor) falls, as  does temptation spending. 
There are no significant effects on well-being measures, although several of the point 24 
 
estimates are positive and close-to-significant. In all, we do not find robust evidence that 
low-education  individuals  are  systematically  harmed  by  expanded  access  to  credit; 
although the hints that income falls is worrisome, there are no corroborating mechanisms 
to generate that effect and thus it seems just as likely to be a consequence of multiple 
outcome  testing  as  a  true  negative  result.  Only  2  of  the  34  treatment  effects  are 
significantly different for the two education sub-groups using the adjusted critical levels. 
Urban/rural 
We next examine impacts in rural and then urban areas (27 and 73% of the sample).
30  We 
find a strong first stage of  similar magnitudes (Figure 9.c) for both sub-groups (Figures 
9.a and 9.b).   
 
However, the loans are used differently. In rural areas (Figure 9.a), loan access increases 
investment:  business  ownership,  expenditures,  revenues,  and  business  income  show 
statistical and economically significant increases,  and higher increases than in urban 
areas. The effect on participation in an economic activity is also significantly higher in 
rural areas. There is some evidence of improvements  in decision power, but no  other 
statistically significant treatment effects on the welfare measures.   
 
In urban areas (Figure 9.b), on the other hand, loans seem to be primarily used for risk 
and debt management. Access to loans causes a reduction in fire sales for loan repayment, 
and membership in informal savings groups declines (although not by significantly more 
than for rural individuals). Labor supply and business ownership decrease. Happiness, 
trust in people, and decision power all improve  (though not significantly more than in 
rural areas). One interpretation of these results is that  urban-area women can smooth 
consumption using credit instead of low -return,  unpleasant  “survival”  activities  (e.g. 
being a street vendor). 
 
Socio-economic variables using the panel sub-sample 
From here forward we use baseline data to measure sub-group characteristics and hence 
are limited to the panel sub-sample. This explains why the confidence intervals are wider 
in Figures 10-16 than in Figures 7-9. One should also keep in mind the caveats re: the 
external validity of the panel-sub sample; on balance, we find some evidence that AIT 
effects are less favorable here than in the full sample (Appendix Figure 1; compare to 
Figure 2). 
Income   
Figures 10.a and 10.b summarize results by baseline income per adult in the household. 
We do not find differences in the first stage, although the effects for the high-income 
group are weaker than for most other groups. Overall there are few significantly different 
treatment effects across the two sub-groups (Figure 10.c). Nevertheless, the pattern of 
results is weakly suggestive of some important heterogeneity in treatment effects. Those 
with  above-median  income  (Figure  10.a)  have  few  significant  treatment  effects:  one 
                                                 
30  In unreported results, we find no impact on "anyone has left" the household in the last 2 years 
or "number of people who have left" in the last 2 years. Here an urban area is defined as having a 
population above 16,000 people.   25 
 
positive (on children not working) and two negative (on business ownership and locus of 
control). Those with below-median income (Figure 10.b) have one positive treatment 
effect (on the intensive margin of decision power), and five negative ones (on profits, 
business problems, locus of control, trust in institutions, and life satisfaction).   
Formal credit experience 
Figures 11.a and 11.b show results for those with and without formal credit experience at 
baseline.
31  This could be a particularly important cat egorization, with theories in both 
directions. One could argue that experience  gives people better financial management 
skills  (including  the  decision  to  borrow  in  the  first  place),  and  hence  the  more -
experienced would  fare better  from expanded credit ac cess. Formal credit experience 
might also be correlated with other inputs that increase returns to borrowing. On the other 
hand, if learning is incomplete then formal credit experience might actually proxy for 
proclivity to overborrow. 
 
We find similar first stages for the two groups (Figure 11.c). There are six significantly 
different treatment effects on more ultimate outcomes, with five of them (all measures of 
“Other Welfare”) favoring the formal credit experience group. The point estimates also 
suggest that the formal group has higher profits (p-value 0.2). These differences are likely 
even larger than they appear at first sight, considering that the take-up rate is significantly 
higher  in  the  formal  group  (15.4%,  vs.  10.5%  in  the  group  without  formal  credit 
experience). 
 
Looking  at  the  groups  individually,  those  with  formal  credit  experience  have  four 
significant  treatment  effects  using  adjusted  critical  values.    Three  are  positive  (on 
growing a business, health, and decision power), and one is negative (fire sales increase). 
Those without formal credit experience have five significant treatment effects. One is 
positive (on the extensive margin of decision power), and four are negative (on job stress, 
locus of control, life satisfaction, and economic satisfaction). 
 
In all, the results here provide some evidence that those with no formal credit experience 
fare  worse  when  credit  access  expands,  mostly  with  respect  to  subjective  well-being 
outcomes. We discuss this more in the conclusion. 
Formal Account Experience 
Figures 12.a and 12.b show results for those with and without prior experience with an 
account with a bank or cooperative (20% and 80% of the panel). Part of the motivation 
here is unpacking the results on formal credit experience: if those lacking experience fare 
worse because they lack skills and knowledge obtained from participating in the formal 
sector per se (not just managing loans), then we would expect to see a similar pattern of 
results  for  those  lacking  formal  account  experience.  While  the  two  variables  are 
positively correlated, we do not find a similar pattern: those lacking experience have two 
significant treatment effects out of 34. Moreover, of the four significant differences in 
treatment effects between the groups (Figure 12.c), three favor the inexperienced.   
                                                 
31  We define formal credit experience as having ever taken out a loan from a bank or financial 
institution.     26 
 
Informal Savings Group Experience 
Figures 13.a and 13.b show results for those with and without prior informal savings 
group participation.  Again,  part of  the motivation  is  unpacking the  results  on formal 
credit experience. The idea here is that those with informal savings group experience 
have already learned how to  manage their finances  in  a  group context,  and one that 
encourages weekly payments (Gugerty 2006; Basu 2011). Those lacking experience may 
lack the requisite financial knowledge and skills to succeed in a group lending setting, in 
which case we might expect to see a pattern of results that parallels those for the no 
formal credit experience sub-group. These two variables are positively correlated, but we 
again  do  not  see  a  similar  pattern:  those  without  experience  have  4  positive  and  3 
negative treatment effects, while those with experience have 2 and 4. Of the 7 significant 
differences,  four  favor  the  inexperienced  (all  business  outcomes)  and  three  favor  the 
experienced (all “other welfare” outcomes). 
 
Preferences 
We next group people by their risk and time preferences, as elicited at baseline. Although 
these preference measures would be difficult for lenders to use in targeting or screening, 
this exercise helps explore mechanisms underlying the somewhat negative effects we find 
above for those with lower income and less experience with formal credit. E.g., are the 
negative  effects  due  to  resource  constraints  (which  might  leave  resource-constrained, 
non-borrowing households vulnerable to negative spillovers from borrowing households), 
and/or to differences in decision making that lead to “overborrowing”? 
Risk preferences 
We form two sub-groups based on elicited risk preferences: risk tolerant, or not. Our 
elicitation method is to give the respondent an opportunity to choose which one of four 
heads-or-tails lotteries they would like to play, hypothetically: {150, 5}, {100, 10}, {80, 
25}, or {50, 50}. From left to right the choices decrease in expected value, but increase in 
the minimum possible payoff. All payoffs are denominated in pesos, so there is no payoff 
larger than $12USD. Given the sharp decline in expected value from the first choice to 
the others, we label the 28% of respondents who choose {150, 5} “risk tolerant”, and 
everyone else “risk intolerant”. 
 
Risk tolerance is an interesting margin for exploring heterogeneous treatment effects for 
at least two reasons. First, risk tolerance may be a necessary condition for pursuing risky 
but  profitable-in-expectation  opportunities  that  open  up  with  the  expansion  of  credit 
access. Hence we would expect risk tolerant respondents to have higher mean treatment 
effects. Second, small-stakes risk aversion is incompatible with standard preferences, and 
hence may be indicative of behavioral biases (e.g., loss aversion) or cognitive limitations 
that could produce overborrowing. 
 
At baseline, risk tolerant individuals are more likely to have a business and a larger 
business (as measured by expenses; the point estimates on revenues, profits, and business 
income  are  also  positive  and  marginally  significant  or  nearly  so).  These  correlations 27 
 
suggest that our proxies for risk preferences do have some validity, despite being elicited 
using a single, hypothetical survey question.
32 
 
Turning to treatment effects for the risk tolerant or intolerant (Figure 14), the results are 
surprising: treatment effects are not clearly positive, or more positive, for the risk tolerant 
(despite the fact that the first stage seems weakly stronger for the risk tolerant). Rather, 
both groups have few significant treatment effects, and there are only three significant 
differences between the risk tolerant and intolerant (Figure 14.c). 
 
Next we categorize respondents as “patient” (56% of the panel) or “impatient” (44%), 
based  on  responses  to  two  standard,  hypothetical,  smaller-sooner  vs.  larger-later 
questions.
33  Figure 15 shows that we again find few significant treatment effects for each 
group. There are three significantly different treatment effects, with two favoring  the 
patient and one favoring the impatient.   
 
Finally, we categorize respondents as “present-biased” (30% of the panel) or not (70%), 
based  on  responses  to  four  standard,  hypothetical,  smaller-sooner  vs.  larger-later 
questions.
34  Bauer et al (2012) find that present-biased Indian villagers are more likely to 
use  microcredit,  and  speculate  that  installment  debt  and/or  joint  liability  serve  as 
commitment devices that improve financial discipline
35. We do not find that present -
biased individuals are more likely to borrow, however (Table 2). And we do not find 
evidence that the present -biased clearly benefit much from microcredit:  Figure 16.a 
shows zero significant treatment effects beyond the first-stage.
36  The non-present-biased 
have  only  one  significant   treatment  effect  (Figure  16.b),  and  we  do  not  find  any 
significant differences between the two groups (Figure 16c).   
Summary of Treatment Effects by Subgroup 
The main takeaway is some, albeit far from overwhelming, evidence that some people 
fare worse when faced with expanded access to credit. Several of the sub -groups have 
more negative treatment effects than positive ones, with the patterns of results for those 
who are poorer  or  without prior use of formal credit access  perhaps the most eye -
opening. 
 
                                                 
32  Risk preferences are typically elicited using more elaborate methods, although some simpler 
methods for measuring risk attitudes have produced measures that are conditionally correlated 
with behavior (Dohmen et al. 2011; Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro 2008). 
33  The first is: “If you could choose between 200 pesos tomorrow and 300 pesos in one month, 
which would you prefer?” If the respondent chooses 200, a follow-up question ups the one-month 
payoff to 400. We label the respondent “patient” if she chooses either larger-later reward. 
34  The first two questions are detailed in the above footnote. The second two questions offer the 
same payoffs at 6 months from today vs. 7 months from today. We label someone present-biased 
if they choose the smaller -sooner amount in the tomorrow vs. 1 -month frame, but at least 
sometime choose the larger-later amount in the 6-month vs. 7-month frame. 
35  Bauer et al (2012) measure present bias using ten smaller-sooner vs. larger-later questions and gave the 
payoff from a randomly-selected choice to a random selection of respondents.   
36  When estimating treatment effects for the present-biased or not-biased, we do not control for 
patience. 28 
 
However, we emphasize the lack of a preponderance of evidence that expanded credit 
access is welfare-reducing for any of the 20 sub-groups examined. First, even within the 
sub-groups that seem to fare worst here – people with below-median income and no prior 
formal  credit—there  are  only  5  and  4  negative  treatment  effects  out  of  34  (Table  8 
Column 10). The likelihood that we would find two or three sub-groups out of twenty 
with at least four negative treatment effects out 34, purely by chance (i.e., due to false 
negatives), is high. Second, there is little evidence that those with lower income fare 
worse than their higher income counterparts, statistically speaking (Table 8 Column 11). 
 
As such, and consistent with the findings from the test of equality of outcome variances, 
we view the results here as motivating further exploration of heterogeneity in treatment 
effects of expanded access to financial services. They are far from definitive statements 
about who wins and loses, or about how many lose. In fact, the full picture of results in 
this  paper  points  more  strongly  to  impacts  that  are  positive  on  balance,  for  most 
borrowers and potential borrowers. 
B.4.  Differential Treatment Effects by Subgroup: all Sub-Group Tests in Same Model 
Our analysis so far has focused on differences by one type of heterogeneity at a time. 
This  approach  yields  policy-relevant  results,  especially  if  lenders  can  readily  target 
potential  clients  by  sub-group.  But  this  approach  does  not  reveal  what  causes  any 
heterogeneity in  treatment  effects; e.g., are differences  between risk tolerant  and risk 
intolerant driven by risk preferences per se, or by a correlation between risk preference 
on some third variable like prior business ownership?   
 
We  explore  the  drivers  of  heterogeneous  treatment  effects  by  including  all  of  the 
heterogeneity  tests  in  the  same  model;  i.e.,  instead  of  the  two  interaction  terms  in 
equation (2), we include three interactions in models estimated on the endline sample: 
treatment  assignment  interacted  with  each  of  prior  business  ownership, 
education>primary, and rural. We also include main effects for each of the three variables 
interacted with treatment assignment. Models estimated on the panel sample take the 
same form, but with nine interactions and main effects instead of three (see Table 9 Panel 
B for the complete list, and note that we cannot include the tenth characteristic, rural vs. 
urban, in the panel sample model because that entire sample is rural). 
 
Table 9 reports counts of the number of times each interaction term is significant and 
significantly positive across outcomes (outcome categories in Columns 1-8, and all 34 
outcomes of ultimate interest in Columns 9-10). Column 9 here is comparable to the 
count across the univariate tests in Table 8 Column 11.   
 
For the most part, the number of significant differences for the majority of characteristics 
decreases  or  remains  the  same  (e.g.  the  number  of  significant  differences  by  formal 
account experience decreases from 4 to 3). The only exceptions are business ownership in 
the full sample, and income and risk tolerance in the panel sample, all of which show just 
one more significant difference when the other covariates are included in the regression. 
Most other subgroups show the same number of differences or one fewer difference. 
Only those subgroups showing more than four differences in Table 8 show a decrease of 29 
 
more than 1 significant difference: location (rural vs. urban), formal credit experience, 
and informal savings experience each show two or more fewer differences.   
 
Overall,  Table  9  indicates  that  few  significant  differences  exist  between  members  of 
subgroups  we  examine.  Relative  to  other  characteristics,  prior  business  ownership, 
location, and informal savings experience appear to differentiate impacts the most. Still, 
the  highest  number  of  significant  differences  for  one  characteristic  (prior  business 
ownership) only represents about one fifth of the possible number of differences (7/34).   
VI.  Conclusion 
We  use  randomized  program  placement  and  household  surveys  to  measure  various 
impacts of Compartamos Banco’s entry into north-central Sonora, Mexico. 
 
Over our three-year evaluation horizon, we find generally positive average effects on our 
sample of borrowers and prospective borrowers: there is evidence that businesses grow, 
that  households  are  better  able  to  manage  liquidity  and  risk,  and  that  (prospective) 
borrowers are happier, more trusting, and have greater intra-household decision power. 
But  there  is  little  evidence  of  wealth-building:  we  do  not  find  evidence  that  profits, 
household income, or consumption increase on average. It may be that wealth-building 
impacts take years to germinate: future research would do well to evaluate impacts over 
longer horizons than 2-3 years. 
 
Compartamos Banco’s expansion also causes heterogeneous treatment effects: we find 
significant differences between treatment and control groups in the standard deviations 
for half of the outcomes tested. Moreover, we also find some evidence of local effects on 
the shapes of outcome distributions; in particular, quantile treatment effects show right-
tail  increases  in  several  outcomes,  including  business  profits.  Treatment  effects  on 
happiness and on trust in people increase throughout their distributions. One way future 
work  might  better  discern  the  welfare  implications  of  credit  expansions  (and  other 
interventions) is to use theories to generate distinct testable predictions about impacts on 
higher moments and distributions. 
 
Perhaps  most  importantly,  we  do  not  find  strong  evidence  that  the  credit  expansion 
creates large numbers of “losers” as well as winners. First, there are few significant and 
negative  quantile  treatment  effects  in  the  left  tails,  i.e.  people  in  the  left  tail  of  the 
distribution of outcomes are not hurt by the program. Second, none of the 17 outcomes 
for which we have panel data show significant increases in the likelihood of worsening 
over time in treatment relative to control areas. Third, in the sub-group analysis, there is 
no clear pattern of strongly negative impacts on any of the 20 sub-groups we examine. 
But there are hints that some sub-groups—in particular, those with lower incomes, and 
those without prior formal credit experience—experience negative treatment effects on 
balance.   
 
Concerns about the possibility that expanded access to (expensive) credit does more harm 
than good motivate several lines of inquiry going forward. Understanding what drives 
any  “overborrowing”  is  critical,  and  much  remains  to  be  done  to  unpack  empirical 30 
 
relationships  underpinning  the  many  behavioral  biases  and  heuristics  hypothesized  to 
affect financial decisions.   
 
There  is  also  more  work  to  be  done  on  mechanism  design;  e.g.,  on  how  different 
screening, targeting, and liability rules  affect  both  average impact  and  heterogeneous 
treatment effects. The issue of organizational form looms large in microfinance policy 
debates: our study concerns a lender that has been both widely praised (for expanding 
access to group credit for millions of people) and widely criticized (for being for-profit 
and publicly traded, and for charging higher interest rates than similar lenders do in other 
countries).
37  Would a non-profit lender generate different impacts? More uniform ones? 
Better ones? 
 
Closely related questions concern how product presentation (e.g., marketing, disclosures) 
and pricing mediate impacts. New evidence from a nationwide, non -overlapping study 
with Compartamos on interest rates shows that demand is quite elastic: cutting APRs by 
roughly 10 percentage points (also a 10% decrease) substantially increased lending on 
both the extensive and intensive margins, while proving sustainable (i.e., profit -neutral) 
for Compartamos (Karlan and Zinman 2013). Much work remains to be done to ascertain 
the impacts of price changes on borrowers: how do they change the marginal borrower 
(relative to branch expansion) ?  Are lower prices unambiguously better for consumer 
welfare,  or do  some  higher prices  provide  a  form  of  behavioral  discipline  against 
overborrowing? 
 
The impacts study here, combined with the interest rates study discussed directly above, 
provide  some  unusual  evidence  on  the  mechanics  of  “double  bottom  lines.” 
Compartamos, like many other for-profits (especially in microfinance), has labeled itself 
a  “social  enterprise”  that  maximizes  social  welfare  subject  to  a  profit  maximization 
constraint. The interest rate study suggests that Compartamos can move along the profit-
maximizing  frontier  by  cutting  prices  in  the  face  of  very  elastic  demand,  thereby 
substantially expanding access to credit without making major changes to its operations. 
I.e.,  there  is  a  range  of  prices  in  which  Compartamos  has  satisfied  the  profit 
maximization constraint, and therefore the bank has a degree of freedom to choose a 
price  that  maximizes  social  welfare.  The  results  from  the  two  papers  suggest  that 
maximizing  access,  via  lower  prices,  is  a  simple  solution  to  the  social  enterprise’s 
maximization problem. 
 
A key question remains of course, particularly with respect to those without prior formal 
credit: is this about the type of person, or this is about their lack of experience using 
credit. The first implies improved screening tools in order to help individuals self-select 
into financial transactions that will help them further their own stated goals. In other 
words, how does Compartamos nudge individuals to borrow, or not, to maximize their 
wellbeing as they would self-report in a moment of reflection (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). 
Or,  alternatively,  how  does  Compartamos  provide  additional  training  to  individuals 
                                                 
37  The rates, to be clear, are actually below average compared to both for-profit and non-profit 
microcredit  market  in  Mexico;  they  are  only  high  when  compared  to  other  countries  and 
continents. 31 
 
without prior formal credit experience so that they manage their loan more optimally? 
Importantly, can such training be provided in a profit-neutral way? Evidence from one 
randomized trial on business education found that the increased profits roughly equaled 
the costs from adding in entrepreneurship training to a group-based microcredit program 
(Karlan and Valdivia 2011).   
 
In all, our study adds to the mounting evidence that microcredit is generally beneficial on 
average, but not necessarily transformative in the ways often advertised by practitioners, 
policymakers, and donors. The most consistent impacts come out in the more subjective, 
qualitative wellbeing outcomes, rather than the more traditional economic outcomes such 
as income and consumption.  We also provide new evidence on various distributional 
impacts  suggesting  that  expanded  credit  access  has  multifaceted,  complex,  and 
heterogeneous  effects  on  businesses  and  households.  Better  understanding  of  these 
distributional impacts may hold a key for making progress on the modeling, application, 
and evaluation of credit market innovations and interventions. 
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Appendix 1 
This  Appendix  explains  (1)  why  Levene’s  test  of  equality  of  variances  is  a  test  of 
homogeneous  effects  and  (2)  when  we  can  conclude  that  subjects  with  the  lowest 
counterfactual outcome are the ones who benefit the most from the treatment.   
 
Define Y0 and Y1 as the potential outcomes in the absence and presence of the treatment. 
The  treatment  is  living  in  a  cluster  where  Compartamos  Banco  actively  advertises 
Credito Mujer and which has access to this product. If the treatment effects are constant 
within compliers (c=1) and within non-compliers (c=0) and amount to Tc and T(1-c), then 
Y0=Y0cc+Y0(1-c)(1-c) and Y1=c(Y0cc + Tc)+(1-c)(Y0(1-c)+ T(1-c)). In this case the variances 
of  Y0  and  Y1  are  identical,  i.e.  Var(Y0)=Var(Y1).  Note,  however,  that  one  could  have 
heterogeneous effects even if Var(Y0)=Var(Y1), if the covariance of the treatment effects, 
T, with Y0 is negative and such that Cov(Y0,T)=1/2[Var(Y0)+Var(T)]. Therefore, this test 
is informative only if we reject the null. 
 
To simplify the notation, write down the individual-specific potential outcomes as Y1 
=Y0+T.  In  this  case,  Var(Y1)=Var(Y0+T)=Var(Y0)+Var(T)+2Cov(Y0,T).If   
Var(Y1)<Var(Y0),  the  covariance  Cov(Y0,T)  is  negative.  This  finding  suggests  that  the 
benefits  of  the  availability  of  Credito  Mujer  may  be  larger  for  people  with  lower 
outcomes in the absence of the treatment.   
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 Mean
Difference: 
Treatment - 
Control Balance Test Mean
Difference: 
Treatment - 
Control Balance Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 1 0 1 0
Age 37.664 0.504* 0.001** 39.345 0.711 0.001
(0.086) (0.286) (0.000) (0.254) (0.805) (0.002)
Primary school or none 0.289 -0.011 -0.022 0.324 0.015 -0.039
(omitted: above high school) (0.004) (0.012) (0.023) (0.011) (0.033) (0.093)
Middle school 0.399 0.009 -0.004 0.378 0.012 -0.026
(0.004) (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.026) (0.069)
High school 0.235 -0.000 -0.006 0.210 -0.033 -0.057
(0.003) (0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.027) (0.080)
Prior business owner 0.244 0.005 0.000 0.488 -0.015 -0.006
(0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.029) (0.027)
In urban area 0.726 0.000 0.298
(0.003) (0.000) (0.284)
Married 0.766 -0.023 -0.030
(omitted: single) (0.010) (0.027) (0.034)
Separated 0.082 0.005 -0.019
(0.006) (0.017) (0.052)
Household income per adult in 
the last 30 days (000s) 1.571 -0.063 -0.002
(0.043) (0.103) (0.007)
High risk aversion 0.716 -0.042 -0.053*
(0.011) (0.026) (0.030)
High formal credit experience 0.315 -0.044* -0.046
(0.011) (0.025) (0.028)
Impatient now 0.445 0.018 0.031
(0.012) (0.026) (0.025)
Present bias 0.300 -0.057** -0.067**
(0.011) (0.022) (0.027)
Has had a formal account 0.198 -0.012 -0.006
(0.009) (0.026) (0.031)
Has been a member of an 
informal savings group 0.238 -0.034 -0.030
(0.010) (0.022) (0.028)
Share of sample in treatment 
group 0.499 0.374
pvalue of F test of joint 
significance of explanatory 
variables 0.337 0.222
N 16560 16560 16489 1823 1823 1790
Number of clusters 238 238 238 33 33 33
Table 1: Summary statistics and balance tests
A. Full Endline Sample Frame B. Baseline for Panel Sample Frame
Respondents are Mexican women aged 18-60. Respondents in the panel sample all reside in rural areas. Columns 2 and 5 report the coefficient 
on treatment assignment (1=Treatment, 0=Control) when the variable in the row is regressed on treatment assignment. Columns 3 and 6 report 
the results of balance tests. The cells show the coefficient for each variable when they are all included in one regression with treatment 
assignment as the dependent variable. Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients. All regressions include supercluster  fixed  
effects and standard errors clustered by the unit of randomization. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01.  A. Treatment Group in Endline Sample
Takeup Takeup
Partial Adjusted R-
Squared
(1) (2a) (2b)
Female 0 0
Age 31 - 40 0.030** -0.007
(omitted: 18-30) (0.012) (0.050)
Age 41 - 50 0.030** -0.044
(0.014) (0.048)
Age 51 - 60 0.025 0.033
(0.016) (0.063)
Primary school or none 0.034* -0.114**
(omitted: above high school) (0.019) (0.045)
Middle school 0.065*** -0.043
(0.020) (0.046)
High school 0.037* -0.092*
(0.021) (0.049)
Prior business owner 0.096*** 0.047
(0.011) (0.033)
In urban area 0.092*
(0.051)
Married 0.083
(omitted: single) (0.067)
Separated -0.001
(0.075)
Household income per adult in 
the last 30 days (000s) -0.010
(0.006)
High risk aversion -0.046
(0.031)
High formal credit experience 0.014
(0.072)
Impatient now 0.002
(0.030)
Present bias 0.025
(0.030)
Has had a formal account -0.006
(0.036)
Has been a member of an 
informal savings group 0.000
(0.000)
Variables for:
P-value for Joint 
Significance
Household demographics 0.531 -0.0006
Household materials 0.677 -0.0013
Wealth and Expenditures 0.437 -0.0063
Subjective welfare 0.286 0.0005
Business size 0.153 -0.0068
Business expectations 0.561 -0.0018
Credit expectations 0.008 0.0361
Credit familiarity 0.003 0.0036
Credit experience 0.000 -0.0064
Share of sample that took up 0.189 0.119
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.023
N 8262 682 682
Number of clusters 120 16 16
Table 2: Takeup analysis
Respondents are Mexican women aged 18-60. Respondents in the panel sample all reside in rural areas. Columns 1 and 2a  
show the coefficient for each variable when they are all included in one OLS regression with takeup as the dependent variable. 
The standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients and are clustered by the unit of randomization. Column 2b shows 
the value of the Adjusted R-Squared when the regression includes the variable(s) in the row minus the value of the Adjusted R-
Squared when the regression does not include the variable(s) in the row. Other baseline variables, listed below the line,  are also 
included in the regression for the panel sample. The P-Value for Joint Significance column for the panel sample reports the p-
value for a test that the coefficients on the variables in the row are jointly equal to zero. All regressions include supercluster  
fixed  effects. The coefficient on membership in an informal savings group is 0 because it was dropped from the regression due 
to collinearity with other variables.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01.
B. Treatment Group in Panel SampleOutcome: Total # Total amount
# from 
Compartamos
Amount from 
Compartamos
# from a 
moneylender 
or pawnshop
Amount from 
a 
moneylender 
or pawnshop
Formal credit 
is 1st choice 
for credit
Satisfied 
w/access to 
financial 
services (1/0)
Member of 
informal 
savings group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Average intent-to-treat effects (OLS, full sample)
Treatment 0.121*** 1248.488*** 0.108*** 644.844*** -0.001 28.156 -0.01 -0.005 -0.019***
(0.035) (470.749) (0.012) (75.732) (0.004) (26.373) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007)
 
Baseline value 
controlled for No Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.013 0.005 0.039 0.023 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.023
N 16177 15602 15788 15768 15968 15963 14076 14879 16551
Number missing 383 958 772 792 592 597 2484 1681 9
Unadjusted p-value 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.841 0.287 0.347 0.675 0.009
Significant adjusted? Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes
Control group mean 0.95 6702.579 0.051 286.851 0.026 71.127 0.341 0.453 0.228
% = 0 in control 46.323 47.924 96.1 96.199 98.006 98.068 65.94 54.657 77.209
Treatment effect on 
likelihood non-zero 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.001 0.000 -0.010 -0.005 -0.020***
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008)
Treatment group 
standard deviation  1.436 32197.997 0.495 3985.405 0.188 1268.178
Control group 
standard deviation 1.299 22156.605 0.282 2039.400 0.204 957.999
p-value for test of 
equality of standard 
deviations 0.006 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.964
Significant adjusted? Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
p-value for test of 
equality of standard 
deviations - panel only 0.028 0.849 0.000 0.000 0.678 0.089
Significant adjusted? Yes No Yes Yes No No
p-value for test of 
equality of variance 
for residuals, SES 0.026 0.488 0.000 0.000 0.589 0.084
Significant adjusted? Yes No Yes Yes No No
p-value for test of 
equality of variance 
for residuals, SES + 
preferences 0.024 0.453 0.000 0.000 0.625 0.077
Significant adjusted? Yes No Yes Yes No No
Panel B: Likelihood of increase from baseline (logit, panel sample)
Treatment 0.090*** 0.007 0.006 -0.017
  (0.032) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
Significant adjusted? Yes No No
Mean in the control 
group 0.441 0.012 0.015 0.116
Panel C: Likelihood of decrease from baseline (logit, panel sample)
Treatment 0.004 0.011 0.011 -0.008
  (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016)
Significant adjusted? No No No
Mean in the control 
group 0.091 0.038 0.038 0.114
N for panels B & C 1705 1751 1749 1823
Table 3: Average Intent-to-Treat Effects on Credit and Other Financial Services 
Household Loans in the Last 2 Years Financial Access
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
Specification: Standard errors, clustered by 238 geographic clusters (the unit of randomization), are in parentheses. Treatment effect on likelihood non-zero 
shows probit marginal effects with standard errors below; panels B and C report logit marginal effects. Controls for randomization strata (i.e. 45 supercluster 
fixed effects and 3 branches) are included but not shown. Controls for the baseline value of the outcome (its value, and missing/non-missing value) are included 
when the outcome was measured in the baseline. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, we adjust critical levels following the approach by Benjamini and 
Hochberg. The significance of each coefficient following this adjustment (if applied) is shown in Panel A. If a control was added for the baseline value of the 
outcome, any missing values for the baseline observation of the outcome were coded as zero and a variable was added that is equal to one if the baseline value is 
missing and zero otherwise.
Outcome(s): The number of loans in columns 2 and 3 refer to the most recent 3 loans, first among the respondent's loans and then within the household. The 
dependent variable in column 7 represents responses to a question asking respondents where they would go to obtain a loan of 6,000 pesos tomorrow. The 
adjusted critical values were calculated by treating columns 1-6 and 7-9 each as a separate family of outcomes.Outcome:
Has a 
business
Has ever 
owned a 
business
Used a loan to 
grow a 
business
Number of 
employees
Revenues in 
the last 2 
weeks
Expenditures 
in the last 2 
weeks
Profits in the 
last 2 weeks
Household 
business 
income last 
month
No financial 
problems 
managing 
business in 
the last year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Average intent-to-treat effects (OLS, full sample)
Treatment -0.004 -0.001 0.008** 0.003 121.004** 118.814** -0.208 60.58 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.010) (52.512) (47.419) (38.983) (63.891) (0.005)
 
Baseline value 
controlled for Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Adjusted R-squared 0.025 0.085 0.011 0.016 0.009 0.001 0 0.02 0.003
N 16560 16557 16529 16560 16093 16184 15994 15577 16534
Number missing 0 3 31 0 467 376 566 983 26
Unadjusted p-value 0.657 0.882 0.042 0.738 0.022 0.013 0.996 0.344 0.119
Significant adjusted? No Yes Yes No No
Control group mean 0.243 0.389 0.05 0.145 450.328 327.595 145.388 839.818 0.944
% = 0 in control 75.693 61.143 94.961 90.648 81.105 86.156 82.171 73.67 5.602
Treatment effect on 
likelihood non-zero -0.004 -0.001 0.008** -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.007
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.004)
Treatment group 
standard deviation  0.532 3082.823 5184.061 5015.812 3292.372
Control group 
standard deviation 0.539 2321.344 1753.038 1711.938 2783.683
p-value for test of 
equality of standard 
deviations 0.233 0.000 0.000 0.233 0.723
Significant adjusted? No Yes Yes No No
p-value for test of 
equality of standard 
deviations - panel only 0.809 0.032 0.003 0.298 0.066
Significant adjusted? No Yes Yes No No
p-value for test of 
equality of variance 
for residuals, SES 0.900 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.015
Significant adjusted? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value for test of 
equality of variance 
for residuals, SES + 
preferences 0.954 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.013
Significant adjusted? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Likelihood of increase from baseline (logit, panel sample)
Treatment -0.016 -0.017 0.016* 0.070** -0.002 0.088 -0.018 0.058
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.009) (0.031) (0.044) (0.057) (0.054) (0.037)
Significant adjusted? No No No No No
Mean in the control 
group 0.133 0.143 0.040 0.184 0.540 0.394 0.502 0.489
Panel C: Likelihood of decrease from baseline (logit, panel sample)
Treatment 0.004 0.001 0.019 -0.023 -0.039 0.006 -0.048
  (0.016) (0.006) (0.041) (0.044) (0.045) (0.061) (0.037)
Significant adjusted? No No No No No
Mean in the control 
group 0.098 0.021 0.156 0.352 0.329 0.375 0.375
N for panels B & C 1823 1823 1820 498 445 454 430 439
Table 4: Average Intent-to-Treat Effects on Business Outcomes 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
Specification: Standard errors, clustered by 238 geographic clusters (the unit of randomization), are in parentheses. Treatment effect on likelihood non-zero 
shows probit marginal effects with standard errors below; panels B and C report logit marginal effects. Controls for randomization strata (i.e. 45 supercluster 
fixed effects and 3 branches) are included but not shown. Controls for the baseline value of the outcome (its value, and missing/non-missing value) are included 
when the outcome was measured in the baseline. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, we adjust critical levels following the approach by Benjamini and 
Hochberg. The significance of each coefficient following this adjustment (if applied) is shown in Panel A. If a control was added for the baseline value of the 
outcome, any missing values for the baseline observation of the outcome were coded as zero and a variable was added that is equal to one if the baseline value is 
missing and zero otherwise.
Outcome(s): Business profits (column 7) are calculated by substracting responses for expenses from responses for revenues of the businesses. Income in column 
8 is calculated from a question asking an explicit, all-in question about household income from business or productive activity. Sample sizes are lower in 
columns 4-8 of Panels B and C because, having found no effect on transitions into business ownership in columns 1 and 2, we select only business owners in 
columns 4-8. The adjusted critical values were calculated by treating columns 4-8 as an outcome family.Last week Last 2 weeks Last 30 days
Outcome:
Did not sell 
an asset to 
help pay for a 
loan
Used a loan to 
buy any asset
Amount spent 
on temptation 
goods
Amount spent 
on groceries
Nights did not 
go hungry
Amount spent 
on school and 
medical 
expenses
Amount spent 
on family 
events
Asset 
categories 
bought item 
from
Did not sell 
an asset
Made home 
improvement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Average intent-to-treat effects (OLS, full sample)
Treatment 0.010** -0.004 -5.857** -1.179 0.053 863.846 -29.8 -0.049** 0.007 -0.014
(0.004) (0.008) (2.704) (29.257) (0.065) (852.120) (89.766) (0.022) (0.007) (0.010)
 
Baseline value 
controlled for No No No No No No No No No No
Adjusted R-squared 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.026 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.011 0.006 0.007
N 16552 16534 16164 16201 16429 16413 16373 16494 16483 16507
Number missing 8 26 396 359 131 147 187 66 77 53
Unadjusted p-value 0.011 0.566 0.031 0.968 0.415 0.312 0.740 0.030 0.330 0.181
Significant adjusted? No No No No No No No No
Control group mean 0.951 0.171 99.463 1683.656 29.2 3475.976 870.874 0.505 0.862 0.377
% = 0 in control 4.907 82.894 21.519 1.133 0.498 29.242 88.237 64.898 13.792 62.334
Treatment effect on 
likelihood non-zero 0.009*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0.002* -0.006 -0.000 -0.027** 0.006 -0.014
  (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010)
Treatment group 
standard deviation  126.696 1195.798 2.890 55084.963 5018.143 0.764
Control group 
standard deviation 126.886 1034.827 3.177 14780.896 5762.358 0.801
p-value for test of 
equality of standard 
deviations 0.992 0.014 0.029 0.047 0.764 0.001
Significant adjusted? No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
p-value for test of 
equality of standard 
deviations - panel only 0.893 0.258 0.047 0.101 0.017 0.001
Significant adjusted? No No Yes No Yes Yes
p-value for test of 
equality of variance 
for residuals, SES 0.907 0.591 0.133 0.119 0.022 0.000
Significant adjusted? No No No No Yes Yes
p-value for test of 
equality of variance 
for residuals, SES + 
preferences 0.864 0.620 0.120 0.150 0.022 0.000
Significant adjusted? No No No No Yes Yes
Outcome(s): All amounts are in pesos. Responses in dollars were converted at a rate of 12 pesos per dollar.  Column 3 includes cigarettes, sweets, and soda. Column 7 refers to 
important events such as weddings, baptisms, birthdays, graduations, or funerals. The survey instrument did not include details about the value of assets bought and sold unless they 
were bought or sold in relation to a loan. Consequently, we report the count of assets in column 8 instead of their value. The adjusted critical values were calculated by treating 
outcomes in columns 3-10 as one outcome family. 
Table 5: Average Intent-to-Treat Effects on Household Consumption and Expenditures 
Use of loan proceeds Last year Last 2 years
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
Specification: Standard errors, clustered by 238 geographic clusters (the unit of randomization), are in parentheses. Treatment effect on likelihood non-zero shows probit marginal 
effects with standard errors below. Controls for randomization strata (i.e. 45 supercluster fixed effects and 3 branches) are included but not shown. Controls for the baseline value of 
the outcome (its value, and missing/non-missing value) are included when the outcome was measured in the baseline. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, we adjust critical 
levels following the approach by Benjamini and Hochberg. The significance of each coefficient following this adjustment (if applied) is shown in Panel A. Outcome: Total income
Income from 
salaried and 
non-salaried 
jobs
Participated in 
an economic 
activity
Amount of 
remittances 
received
Income 
greater than or 
equal to 
expenses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Average intent-to-treat effects (OLS, full sample)
Treatment 26.062 -29.791 -0.011 -26.152 0.01
(156.972) (127.732) (0.009) (34.934) (0.009)
 
Baseline value 
controlled for Yes No No Yes No
Adjusted R-squared 0.019 0.01 0.008 0.002 0.004
N 15240 16155 16560 16368 16426
Number missing 1320 405 0 192 134
Unadjusted p-value 0.868 0.816 0.252 0.455 0.255
Significant adjusted? No No No No No
Control group mean 6176.089 4540.709 0.478 198.35 0.385
% = 0 in control 1.216 17.928 52.217 96.056 61.549
Treatment effect on 
likelihood non-zero -0.001 -0.009 -0.011 0.002 0.010
  (0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Treatment group 
standard deviation  6428.145 5268.009 1579.322
Control group 
standard deviation 6034.154 5115.035 2067.668
p-value for test of 
equality of standard 
deviations 0.638 0.285 0.032
Significant adjusted? No No Yes
p-value for test of 
equality of standard 
deviations - panel only 0.728 0.684 0.020
Significant adjusted? No No Yes
p-value for test of 
equality of variance 
for residuals, SES 0.858 0.912 0.042
Significant adjusted? No No No
p-value for test of 
equality of variance 
for residuals, SES + 
preferences 0.720 0.770 0.052
Significant adjusted? No No No
Panel B: Likelihood of increase from baseline (logit, panel sample)
Treatment -0.012 0.017*
  (0.027) (0.010)
Significant adjusted? No No
Mean in the control 
group 0.626 0.027
Panel C: Likelihood of decrease from baseline (logit, panel sample)
Treatment 0.019 0.009
  (0.030) (0.010)
Significant adjusted? No No
Mean in the control 
group 0.339 0.049
N for panels B & C 1679 1800
Table 6: Average Intent-to-Treat Effects on Household Income and Savings 
Last 30 days Last 6 months
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
Specification: Standard errors, clustered by 238 geographic clusters (the unit of randomization), are 
in parentheses. Treatment effect on likelihood non-zero shows probit marginal effects with standard 
errors below; panels B and C report logit marginal effects. Controls for randomization strata (i.e. 45 
supercluster fixed effects and 3 branches) are included but not shown. Controls for the baseline value 
of the outcome (its value, and missing/non-missing value) are included when the outcome was 
measured in the baseline. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, we adjust critical levels 
following the approach by Benjamini and Hochberg. The significance of each coefficient following 
this adjustment (if applied) is shown in Panel A. If a control was added for the baseline value of the 
outcome, any missing values for the baseline observation of the outcome were coded as zero and a 
variable was added that is equal to one if the baseline value is missing and zero otherwise.
Outcome(s): Anyone reporting having a job or a business is classified as participating in an economic 
activity (column 3). For column 5, anyone reporting having income greater than expenses, less 
purchase of a house or a car or a big investment or debt, in the last 6 months is coded as a 1. The 
adjusted critical values were calculated by treating all outcomes in the table as one outcome family.Child welfare
Outcome:
Depression 
index (higher 
= happier)
Job stress 
index (higher 
= less stress)
Locus of 
control index
Trust in 
institutions 
index
Trust in 
people index
Satisfaction 
(life and 
harmony) 
index
Satisfied with 
economic 
situation
Good health 
status
Fraction of 
children 4-17 
not working
Participates in 
any financial 
decisions
# of 
household 
issues she has 
a say on
# of 
household 
issues in 
which conflict 
arises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Average intent-to-treat effects (OLS, full sample)
Treatment 0.045* -0.004 0.003 -0.011 0.049* 0.017 -0.009 0.012 0.007 0.008*** 0.071** 0.023
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.030) (0.033)
 
Baseline value 
controlled for Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes No No No
Adjusted R-squared 0.031 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.027 0.009 0.007 0.025 0.013 0.001 0.01 0.016
N 16336 7656 16549 16530 16558 16553 16526 16556 12305 12183 12379 12400
Number missing 224 8904 11 30 2 7 34 4 4255 4377 4181 4160
Unadjusted p-value 0.059 0.870 0.915 0.653 0.067 0.473 0.418 0.125 0.236 0.009 0.020 0.479
Significant adjusted? Yes Yes No
Control group mean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.458 0.779 0.915 0.975 2.78 1.525
% = 0 in control 0 0 0 0 0 0 54.239 22.061 5.896 2.503 9.252 35.043
Treatment effect on 
likelihood non-zero -0.009 0.012 0.002 0.007*** 0.007 0.004
  (0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.012)
Treatment group 
standard deviation  0.973 1.019 0.996 1.007 0.985 0.999 0.245 1.312 1.421
Control group 
standard deviation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.254 1.336 1.415
p-value for test of 
equality of standard 
deviations 0.032 0.259 0.447 0.242 0.299 0.959 0.013 0.016 0.826
Significant adjusted? Yes No
p-value for test of 
equality of standard 
deviations - panel only 0.326 0.467 0.149 0.067 0.108 0.647 0.632 0.833 0.191
Significant adjusted? No No
p-value for test of 
equality of variance 
for residuals, SES 0.464 0.325 0.307 0.054 0.147 0.234 0.848 0.701 0.188
Significant adjusted? No No
p-value for test of 
equality of variance 
for residuals, SES + 
preferences 0.492 0.668 0.356 0.057 0.134 0.184 0.853 0.649 0.298
Significant adjusted? No No
Panel B: Likelihood of increase from baseline (logit, panel sample)
Treatment 0.014 0.026* 0.014
  (0.031) (0.015) (0.020)
Mean in the control 
group 0.535 0.112 0.871
Panel C: Likelihood of decrease from baseline (logit, panel sample)
Treatment -0.014 -0.007 -0.004
  (0.031) (0.015) (0.006)
Mean in the control 
group 0.465 0.092 0.024
N for panels B & C 1800 1823 1369
Table 7: Average Intent-to-Treat Effects on Various Measures of Welfare 
Subjective well-being Intra-household decision power
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
Specification: Standard errors, clustered by 238 geographic clusters (the unit of randomization), are in parentheses. Treatment effect on likelihood non-zero shows probit marginal effects with standard errors 
below; panels B and C report logit marginal effects. Controls for randomization strata (i.e. 45 supercluster fixed effects and 3 branches) are included but not shown. Controls for the baseline value of the 
outcome (its value, and missing/non-missing value) are included when the outcome was measured in the baseline. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, we adjust critical levels following the approach by 
Benjamini and Hochberg. The significance of each coefficient following this adjustment (if applied) is shown in Panel A. If a control was added for the baseline value of the outcome, any missing values for the 
baseline observation of the outcome were coded as zero and a variable was added that is equal to one if the baseline value is missing and zero otherwise.
Outcome(s): Higher values in the indices denote beneficial outcomes. Column 1 consists of a standard battery of 20 questions that ask about thoughts and feelings in the last week. The feelings and mindsets 
include:  being bothered by things that do not normally bother you, having a poor appetite, not being able to shake off the blues even with support from friends and family, feeling just as good as other people, 
having trouble focusing, feeling depressed, feeling like everything required extra effort, being hopeful about the future, thinking your life was a failure, feeling fearful, having restless sleep, feeling happy, talking 
less than usual, being lonely, thinking people were unfriendly, having crying spells, enjoying life, feeling sad, thinking people dislike you, feeling like you couldn’t keep going on. In column 2, the sample frame 
is restricted to just those that report participating in an economic activity; the index includes three questions about job stress. The index of locus of control in column 3 includes five questions about locus of 
control.  In column 4, institutions include government workers, financial workers, and banks. Trust in people in column 5 includes questions about trust in family, neighbors, personal acquaintances, people just 
met, business acquaintances, people who borrow money, strangers, and a question about whether people would be generally fair. Columns 10-12 only include married respondents living with another adult.Outcome area:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Subgroup Sample + - + - + - + - + - Total A > B
A. Full sample 4 1 3 0 1 0 4 0 8 0
B. Panel sample 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
A. Prior business owner Full 3 1 5 0 1 0 2 0 8 0
B. Not a prior business owner Full 4 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 4 0
A. Education > Primary Full 4 0 3 0 1 0 3 0 7 0
B. Education <= Primary Full 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A. In rural area Full 3 0 5 0 0 0 1 0 6 0
B. In urban area Full 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 0 6 2
A. Above median HH income per adult Panel 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 2
B. Below median HH income per adult Panel 2 1 0 2 0 0 1 3 1 5
A. Formal prior credit experience Panel 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 3 1
B. No formal credit experience Panel 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 4
A. Formal account experience Panel 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 2 3
B. No formal account experience Panel 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
A. Member of informal savings group Panel 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 1 2 4
B. Not member of informal savings group Panel 2 0 4 0 0 1 0 2 4 3
A. Risk tolerant Panel 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1
B. Risk intolerant Panel 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 2
A. Patient now Panel 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 2
B. Impatient now Panel 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 2
A. Present biased Panel 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B. Not present biased Panel 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
 The table summarizes the results presented in Figures 6-15 using adjusted p-values. Each cell is a count of treatment effects that are significant with 90% confidence using adjusted critical levels 
following the approach by Benjamini and Hochberg. If asset sales and purchases both fall, we count the overall effect as positive. Measurements of Credit and Other Financial Services are excluded 
from the total columns. Consumption of temptation goods and the # of disagreements in which a conflict arises are excluded from all counts. The sample column indicates which sample frame of 
respondents is included in the estimation. We use the full sample for examining heterogeneous effects we can identify using variables in the endline assumed to be static over the treatment period or 
that are retrospective. We use the panel sample for examining heterogeneous effects we can identify using variables in the baseline survey. The final column shows the number of treatment effects that 
are significantly different between the two groups with 90% confidence.   
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Table 8: Summary of Average Intent-to-Treat Effects by Sub-Group with Adjusted P-values: One Specification Per Outcome Per Subgroup
Measures of Credit 
and Other Financial 
Services Business
Income and 
Consumption Other Welfare Total
Significantly different 
effects on outcomesOutcome area:
Total + Total + Total + Total + Total +
Subgroup (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Endline Sample
Treatment X Prior business owner 2 2 4 4 2 2 1 1 7 7
Treatment X Education > Primary 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1
Treatment X In rural area 0 0 4 3 0 0 1 0 5 3
Panel B: Panel Sample
Treatment X Prior business owner 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 4 3
Treatment X Education > Primary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Treatment X Above median HH income per adult 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 3 1
Treatment X Formal prior credit experience 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 3 2
Treatment X Formal account experience 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 1
Treatment X Member of an informal savings group 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 2 5 2
Treatment X Risk intolerant 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 1 4 2
Treatment X Patient now 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 3 2
Treatment X Present biased 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(34 Outcomes)
The table reports the number of statistically significant coefficients on interaction terms for each subgroup within a given category of outcomes and sample. The coefficients are 
from an OLS  regression which includes each subgroup shown in the left hand column along with their interaction with treatment and treatment itself on the right hand side with an 
outcome (e.g. business profits) as  the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered by the unit of randomization. The critical levels are adjusted following the approach by 
Benjamini and Hochberg.       
Table 9: Summary of Average Intent-to-Treat Effects by Sub-Group: All Variables in the Same Regression
Credit & Other 
Financial Services
(9 Measures)
Business
(9 Outcomes)
Income & Consumption
(14 Outcomes)
Other Welfare
(11 Outcomes)
TotalFigure 1: Study Timeline and Survey Locations 
Random Assignment  
(238 communities) 
Compartamos launches Credito Mujer in 
1st treatment community in region 1  
Compartamos launches 
Credito Mujer in 1st 
treatment community in 
region 2 
Compartamos launches 
Credito Mujer in control 
group in regions 1 and 2  
March  -  April 
2009 
April - June 
2010 
November   
2011 
-  March 
2012 
# of Communities  Baseline  Survey 
# of respondents 
Endline Survey 
# of respondents  Treatment  Control 
1. Caborca, Agua 
Prieta, and urban 
areas of Nogales 
104  101  0 
14737 
Average exposure:  
28 months 
 
2. Outlying areas 
of Nogales  16  17  1823 
1823 
Average exposure:  
15 months 
 
Total  120  118  1823  16560 Credit & Other Financial Services
Business
Income & Consumption
Other Welfare
Total #
Total amount
# from Compartamos
Amount from Compartamos
Used a loan to grow a business
Revenues in the last 2 weeks
Expenditures in the last 2 weeks
Did not sell an asset to help pay for a loan
Depression index (higher = happier)
Trust in people index
Participates in any financial decisions
# of household issues she has a say on
Member of informal savings group
Asset categories bought item from in the last 2 years
# from a moneylender or pawnshop
Amount from a moneylender or pawnshop
Formal credit is 1st choice for credit
Satisfied w/access to financial services (1/0)
Has a business
Has ever owned a business
Number of employees
Profits in the last 2 weeks
Household business income last month
No financial problems managing business in the last year
Total income
Income from salaried and non−salaried jobs
Participated in an economic activity
Amount of remittances received
Income greater than or equal to expenses
Used a loan to buy any asset
Amount spent on groceries in the last 2 weeks
Nights did not go hungry
Amount spent on school and medical expenses in the last year
Amount spent on family events in the last year
Did not sell an asset
Made home improvement
Job stress index (higher = less stress)
Locus of control index
Trust in institutions index
Satisfaction (life and harmony) index
Satisfied with economic situation
Good health status
Fraction of children 4−17 not working
# of household issues in which conflict arises
Amount spent on temptation goods in the last week  [ns]
 [ns]
−0.6 −0.5 −0.4 −0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Effect size in standard deviations of the control group or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes ("Total #", "# from Compartamos" and "# from a moneylender")
This figure summarizes the treatment effects presented in Tables 3−7. Here treatment effects on continuous variables are presented in standard deviation units or in # of loans for the borrowing
outcomes (Total #, # from Compartamos, and # from a moneylender or pawnshop). Each line shows the OLS point estimate and 90% confidence interval for that outcome.
For some outcomes, we adjust the critical level following the Benjamini and Hochberg approach. In brackets, we then indicate whether the treatment effect is not significant [ns] at this level
if it is significant at the unadjusted level.
Figure 2: Average Intent−to−Treat Effects for the Full Sample, at a Glance−0.04
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X axis shows the quantile (top row) and the control group value at that quantile (bottom row)
For continuous variables, vertical lines show 90% confidence intervals for quantile treatment effects with standard errors block−bootstrapped by
cluster with 1,000 replications. For count variables, vertical lines show 90% confidence intervals for the AIT estimate of the likelihood of treatment
group respondents having the value on the x axis for that outcome relative to the control group respondents having that value. Standard errors are
clustered by the unit of randomization. A + sign indicates that the value of the variable is at or above that number. The sample for all estimates
includes only business owners, except for the sample in Figure 2b, which includes only business owners with >0 employees.
Figure 3: Quantile Treatment Effects for Business Outcomes−0.04
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X axis shows the quantile (top row) and the control group value at that quantile (bottom row)
For continuous variables, vertical lines show 90% confidence intervals for quantile treatment effects with standard errors block−bootstrapped by
cluster with 1,000 replications. For count variables, vertical lines show 90% confidence intervals for the AIT estimate of the likelihood of treatment
group respondents having the value on the x axis for that outcome relative to the control group respondents having that value. Standard errors are
clustered by the unit of randomization. A + sign indicates that the value of the variable is at or above that number.
Figure 4: Quantile Treatment Effects for Consumption Outcomes−1.50
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X axis shows the quantile (top row) and the control group value at that quantile (bottom row)
Vertical lines show 90% confidence intervals for quantile treatment effects with standard errors block−bootstrapped by cluster with 1,000 replications.
Figure 5: Quantile Treatment Effects for Income Outcomes−0.05
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X axis shows the quantile (top row) and the control group value at that quantile (bottom row)
For continuous variables, vertical lines show 90% confidence intervals for quantile treatment effects with standard errors block−bootstrapped by
cluster with 1,000 replications. For count variables, vertical lines show 90% confidence intervals for the AIT estimate of the likelihood of treatment
group respondents having the value on the x axis for that outcome relative to the control group respondents having that value. Standard errors are
clustered by the unit of randomization. A + sign indicates that the value of the variable is at or above that number.
Figure 6: Quantile Treatment Effects for Other Welfare OutcomesTotal #
Total amount
# from Compartamos
Amount from Compartamos
# from a moneylender or pawnshop
Amount from a moneylender or pawnshop
Formal credit is 1st choice for credit
Satisfied w/access to financial services (1/0)
Member of informal savings group
Has a business
Has ever owned a business
Used a loan to grow a business
Number of employees
Revenues in the last 2 weeks
Expenditures in the last 2 weeks
Profits in the last 2 weeks
Household business income last month
No financial problems managing business in the last year
Total income
Income from salaried and non−salaried jobs
Participated in an economic activity
Amount of remittances received
Income greater than or equal to expenses
Did not sell an asset to help pay for a loan
Used a loan to buy any asset
Amount spent on temptation goods in the last week
Amount spent on groceries in the last 2 weeks
Nights did not go hungry
Amount spent on school and medical expenses in the last year
Amount spent on family events in the last year
Asset categories bought item from in the last 2 years
Did not sell an asset
Made home improvement
Depression index (higher = happier)
Job stress index (higher = less stress)
Locus of control index
Trust in institutions index
Trust in people index
Satisfaction (life and harmony) index
Satisfied with economic situation
Good health status
Fraction of children 4−17 not working
Participates in any financial decisions
# of household issues she has a say on
# of household issues in which conflict arises
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 c. (a − b)  
Effect size in standard deviations of the control group or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes ("Total #", "# from Compartamos" and "# from a moneylender")
Each line shows the OLS point estimate and 90% confidence interval for the outcome on the left and group at the top. Panel C shows the estimate for the difference between the coefficients in panels A
and B. Here treatment effects are presented in standard deviation units or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes (Total #, # from Compartamos, and # from a moneylender or pawnshop). Effects that
are significant at p < . 10 are in black. For some outcomes, we adjust the critical level following the Benjamini and Hochberg approach. In brackets, we then indicate whether the treatment effect is
not significant [ns] at this level if it is significant at the unadjusted level.
Figure 7: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Business OwnershipTotal #
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Amount from Compartamos
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Amount from a moneylender or pawnshop
Formal credit is 1st choice for credit
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Has a business
Has ever owned a business
Used a loan to grow a business
Number of employees
Revenues in the last 2 weeks
Expenditures in the last 2 weeks
Profits in the last 2 weeks
Household business income last month
No financial problems managing business in the last year
Total income
Income from salaried and non−salaried jobs
Participated in an economic activity
Amount of remittances received
Income greater than or equal to expenses
Did not sell an asset to help pay for a loan
Used a loan to buy any asset
Amount spent on temptation goods in the last week
Amount spent on groceries in the last 2 weeks
Nights did not go hungry
Amount spent on school and medical expenses in the last year
Amount spent on family events in the last year
Asset categories bought item from in the last 2 years
Did not sell an asset
Made home improvement
Depression index (higher = happier)
Job stress index (higher = less stress)
Locus of control index
Trust in institutions index
Trust in people index
Satisfaction (life and harmony) index
Satisfied with economic situation
Good health status
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Participates in any financial decisions
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Effect size in standard deviations of the control group or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes ("Total #", "# from Compartamos" and "# from a moneylender")
Each line shows the OLS point estimate and 90% confidence interval for the outcome on the left and group at the top. Panel C shows the estimate for the difference between the coefficients in panels A
and B. Here treatment effects are presented in standard deviation units or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes (Total #, # from Compartamos, and # from a moneylender or pawnshop). Effects that
are significant at p < . 10 are in black. For some outcomes, we adjust the critical level following the Benjamini and Hochberg approach. In brackets, we then indicate whether the treatment effect is
not significant [ns] at this level if it is significant at the unadjusted level.
Figure 8: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by EducationTotal #
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Revenues in the last 2 weeks
Expenditures in the last 2 weeks
Profits in the last 2 weeks
Household business income last month
No financial problems managing business in the last year
Total income
Income from salaried and non−salaried jobs
Participated in an economic activity
Amount of remittances received
Income greater than or equal to expenses
Did not sell an asset to help pay for a loan
Used a loan to buy any asset
Amount spent on temptation goods in the last week
Amount spent on groceries in the last 2 weeks
Nights did not go hungry
Amount spent on school and medical expenses in the last year
Amount spent on family events in the last year
Asset categories bought item from in the last 2 years
Did not sell an asset
Made home improvement
Depression index (higher = happier)
Job stress index (higher = less stress)
Locus of control index
Trust in institutions index
Trust in people index
Satisfaction (life and harmony) index
Satisfied with economic situation
Good health status
Fraction of children 4−17 not working
Participates in any financial decisions
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Effect size in standard deviations of the control group or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes ("Total #", "# from Compartamos" and "# from a moneylender")
Each line shows the OLS point estimate and 90% confidence interval for the outcome on the left and group at the top. Panel C shows the estimate for the difference between the coefficients in panels A
and B. Here treatment effects are presented in standard deviation units or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes (Total #, # from Compartamos, and # from a moneylender or pawnshop). Effects that
are significant at p < . 10 are in black. For some outcomes, we adjust the critical level following the Benjamini and Hochberg approach. In brackets, we then indicate whether the treatment effect is
not significant [ns] at this level if it is significant at the unadjusted level.
Figure 9: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by LocationTotal #
Total amount
# from Compartamos
Amount from Compartamos
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Amount from a moneylender or pawnshop
Formal credit is 1st choice for credit
Satisfied w/access to financial services (1/0)
Member of informal savings group
Has a business
Has ever owned a business
Used a loan to grow a business
Number of employees
Revenues in the last 2 weeks
Expenditures in the last 2 weeks
Profits in the last 2 weeks
Household business income last month
No financial problems managing business in the last year
Total income
Income from salaried and non−salaried jobs
Participated in an economic activity
Amount of remittances received
Income greater than or equal to expenses
Did not sell an asset to help pay for a loan
Used a loan to buy any asset
Amount spent on temptation goods in the last week
Amount spent on groceries in the last 2 weeks
Nights did not go hungry
Amount spent on school and medical expenses in the last year
Amount spent on family events in the last year
Asset categories bought item from in the last 2 years
Did not sell an asset
Made home improvement
Depression index (higher = happier)
Job stress index (higher = less stress)
Locus of control index
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Satisfied with economic situation
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Effect size in standard deviations of the control group or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes ("Total #", "# from Compartamos" and "# from a moneylender")
Each line shows the OLS point estimate and 90% confidence interval for the outcome on the left and group at the top. Panel C shows the estimate for the difference between the coefficients in panels A
and B. Here treatment effects are presented in standard deviation units or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes (Total #, # from Compartamos, and # from a moneylender or pawnshop). Effects that
are significant at p < . 10 are in black. For some outcomes, we adjust the critical level following the Benjamini and Hochberg approach. In brackets, we then indicate whether the treatment effect is
not significant [ns] at this level if it is significant at the unadjusted level.
Figure 10: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Household IncomeTotal #
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Amount from a moneylender or pawnshop
Formal credit is 1st choice for credit
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Member of informal savings group
Has a business
Has ever owned a business
Used a loan to grow a business
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Revenues in the last 2 weeks
Expenditures in the last 2 weeks
Profits in the last 2 weeks
Household business income last month
No financial problems managing business in the last year
Total income
Income from salaried and non−salaried jobs
Participated in an economic activity
Amount of remittances received
Income greater than or equal to expenses
Did not sell an asset to help pay for a loan
Used a loan to buy any asset
Amount spent on temptation goods in the last week
Amount spent on groceries in the last 2 weeks
Nights did not go hungry
Amount spent on school and medical expenses in the last year
Amount spent on family events in the last year
Asset categories bought item from in the last 2 years
Did not sell an asset
Made home improvement
Depression index (higher = happier)
Job stress index (higher = less stress)
Locus of control index
Trust in institutions index
Trust in people index
Satisfaction (life and harmony) index
Satisfied with economic situation
Good health status
Fraction of children 4−17 not working
Participates in any financial decisions
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# of household issues in which conflict arises
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Effect size in standard deviations of the control group or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes ("Total #", "# from Compartamos" and "# from a moneylender")
Each line shows the OLS point estimate and 90% confidence interval for the outcome on the left and group at the top. Panel C shows the estimate for the difference between the coefficients in panels A
and B. Here treatment effects are presented in standard deviation units or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes (Total #, # from Compartamos, and # from a moneylender or pawnshop). Effects that
are significant at p < . 10 are in black. For some outcomes, we adjust the critical level following the Benjamini and Hochberg approach. In brackets, we then indicate whether the treatment effect is
not significant [ns] at this level if it is significant at the unadjusted level.
Figure 11: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Credit ExperienceTotal #
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Used a loan to grow a business
Number of employees
Revenues in the last 2 weeks
Expenditures in the last 2 weeks
Profits in the last 2 weeks
Household business income last month
No financial problems managing business in the last year
Total income
Income from salaried and non−salaried jobs
Participated in an economic activity
Amount of remittances received
Income greater than or equal to expenses
Did not sell an asset to help pay for a loan
Used a loan to buy any asset
Amount spent on temptation goods in the last week
Amount spent on groceries in the last 2 weeks
Nights did not go hungry
Amount spent on school and medical expenses in the last year
Amount spent on family events in the last year
Asset categories bought item from in the last 2 years
Did not sell an asset
Made home improvement
Depression index (higher = happier)
Job stress index (higher = less stress)
Locus of control index
Trust in institutions index
Trust in people index
Satisfaction (life and harmony) index
Satisfied with economic situation
Good health status
Fraction of children 4−17 not working
Participates in any financial decisions
# of household issues she has a say on
# of household issues in which conflict arises
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Effect size in standard deviations of the control group or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes ("Total #", "# from Compartamos" and "# from a moneylender")
Each line shows the OLS point estimate and 90% confidence interval for the outcome on the left and group at the top. Panel C shows the estimate for the difference between the coefficients in panels A
and B. Here treatment effects are presented in standard deviation units or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes (Total #, # from Compartamos, and # from a moneylender or pawnshop). Effects that
are significant at p < . 10 are in black. For some outcomes, we adjust the critical level following the Benjamini and Hochberg approach. In brackets, we then indicate whether the treatment effect is
not significant [ns] at this level if it is significant at the unadjusted level.
Figure 12: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Formal Account ExperienceTotal #
Total amount
# from Compartamos
Amount from Compartamos
# from a moneylender or pawnshop
Amount from a moneylender or pawnshop
Formal credit is 1st choice for credit
Satisfied w/access to financial services (1/0)
Member of informal savings group
Has a business
Has ever owned a business
Used a loan to grow a business
Number of employees
Revenues in the last 2 weeks
Expenditures in the last 2 weeks
Profits in the last 2 weeks
Household business income last month
No financial problems managing business in the last year
Total income
Income from salaried and non−salaried jobs
Participated in an economic activity
Amount of remittances received
Income greater than or equal to expenses
Did not sell an asset to help pay for a loan
Used a loan to buy any asset
Amount spent on temptation goods in the last week
Amount spent on groceries in the last 2 weeks
Nights did not go hungry
Amount spent on school and medical expenses in the last year
Amount spent on family events in the last year
Asset categories bought item from in the last 2 years
Did not sell an asset
Made home improvement
Depression index (higher = happier)
Job stress index (higher = less stress)
Locus of control index
Trust in institutions index
Trust in people index
Satisfaction (life and harmony) index
Satisfied with economic situation
Good health status
Fraction of children 4−17 not working
Participates in any financial decisions
# of household issues she has a say on
# of household issues in which conflict arises
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Effect size in standard deviations of the control group or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes ("Total #", "# from Compartamos" and "# from a moneylender")
Each line shows the OLS point estimate and 90% confidence interval for the outcome on the left and group at the top. Panel C shows the estimate for the difference between the coefficients in panels A
and B. Here treatment effects are presented in standard deviation units or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes (Total #, # from Compartamos, and # from a moneylender or pawnshop). Effects that
are significant at p < . 10 are in black. For some outcomes, we adjust the critical level following the Benjamini and Hochberg approach. In brackets, we then indicate whether the treatment effect is
not significant [ns] at this level if it is significant at the unadjusted level.
Figure 13: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Informal Savings ExperienceTotal #
Total amount
# from Compartamos
Amount from Compartamos
# from a moneylender or pawnshop
Amount from a moneylender or pawnshop
Formal credit is 1st choice for credit
Satisfied w/access to financial services (1/0)
Member of informal savings group
Has a business
Has ever owned a business
Used a loan to grow a business
Number of employees
Revenues in the last 2 weeks
Expenditures in the last 2 weeks
Profits in the last 2 weeks
Household business income last month
No financial problems managing business in the last year
Total income
Income from salaried and non−salaried jobs
Participated in an economic activity
Amount of remittances received
Income greater than or equal to expenses
Did not sell an asset to help pay for a loan
Used a loan to buy any asset
Amount spent on temptation goods in the last week
Amount spent on groceries in the last 2 weeks
Nights did not go hungry
Amount spent on school and medical expenses in the last year
Amount spent on family events in the last year
Asset categories bought item from in the last 2 years
Did not sell an asset
Made home improvement
Depression index (higher = happier)
Job stress index (higher = less stress)
Locus of control index
Trust in institutions index
Trust in people index
Satisfaction (life and harmony) index
Satisfied with economic situation
Good health status
Fraction of children 4−17 not working
Participates in any financial decisions
# of household issues she has a say on
# of household issues in which conflict arises
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Effect size in standard deviations of the control group or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes ("Total #", "# from Compartamos" and "# from a moneylender")
Each line shows the OLS point estimate and 90% confidence interval for the outcome on the left and group at the top. Panel C shows the estimate for the difference between the coefficients in panels A
and B. Here treatment effects are presented in standard deviation units or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes (Total #, # from Compartamos, and # from a moneylender or pawnshop). Effects that
are significant at p < . 10 are in black. For some outcomes, we adjust the critical level following the Benjamini and Hochberg approach. In brackets, we then indicate whether the treatment effect is
not significant [ns] at this level if it is significant at the unadjusted level.
Figure 14: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Risk ToleranceTotal #
Total amount
# from Compartamos
Amount from Compartamos
# from a moneylender or pawnshop
Amount from a moneylender or pawnshop
Formal credit is 1st choice for credit
Satisfied w/access to financial services (1/0)
Member of informal savings group
Has a business
Has ever owned a business
Used a loan to grow a business
Number of employees
Revenues in the last 2 weeks
Expenditures in the last 2 weeks
Profits in the last 2 weeks
Household business income last month
No financial problems managing business in the last year
Total income
Income from salaried and non−salaried jobs
Participated in an economic activity
Amount of remittances received
Income greater than or equal to expenses
Did not sell an asset to help pay for a loan
Used a loan to buy any asset
Amount spent on temptation goods in the last week
Amount spent on groceries in the last 2 weeks
Nights did not go hungry
Amount spent on school and medical expenses in the last year
Amount spent on family events in the last year
Asset categories bought item from in the last 2 years
Did not sell an asset
Made home improvement
Depression index (higher = happier)
Job stress index (higher = less stress)
Locus of control index
Trust in institutions index
Trust in people index
Satisfaction (life and harmony) index
Satisfied with economic situation
Good health status
Fraction of children 4−17 not working
Participates in any financial decisions
# of household issues she has a say on
# of household issues in which conflict arises
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Effect size in standard deviations of the control group or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes ("Total #", "# from Compartamos" and "# from a moneylender")
Each line shows the OLS point estimate and 90% confidence interval for the outcome on the left and group at the top. Panel C shows the estimate for the difference between the coefficients in panels A
and B. Here treatment effects are presented in standard deviation units or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes (Total #, # from Compartamos, and # from a moneylender or pawnshop). Effects that
are significant at p < . 10 are in black. For some outcomes, we adjust the critical level following the Benjamini and Hochberg approach. In brackets, we then indicate whether the treatment effect is
not significant [ns] at this level if it is significant at the unadjusted level.
Figure 15: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by PatienceTotal #
Total amount
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Amount from Compartamos
# from a moneylender or pawnshop
Amount from a moneylender or pawnshop
Formal credit is 1st choice for credit
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Member of informal savings group
Has a business
Has ever owned a business
Used a loan to grow a business
Number of employees
Revenues in the last 2 weeks
Expenditures in the last 2 weeks
Profits in the last 2 weeks
Household business income last month
No financial problems managing business in the last year
Total income
Income from salaried and non−salaried jobs
Participated in an economic activity
Amount of remittances received
Income greater than or equal to expenses
Did not sell an asset to help pay for a loan
Used a loan to buy any asset
Amount spent on temptation goods in the last week
Amount spent on groceries in the last 2 weeks
Nights did not go hungry
Amount spent on school and medical expenses in the last year
Amount spent on family events in the last year
Asset categories bought item from in the last 2 years
Did not sell an asset
Made home improvement
Depression index (higher = happier)
Job stress index (higher = less stress)
Locus of control index
Trust in institutions index
Trust in people index
Satisfaction (life and harmony) index
Satisfied with economic situation
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Effect size in standard deviations of the control group or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes ("Total #", "# from Compartamos" and "# from a moneylender")
Each line shows the OLS point estimate and 90% confidence interval for the outcome on the left and group at the top. Panel C shows the estimate for the difference between the coefficients in panels A
and B. Here treatment effects are presented in standard deviation units or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes (Total #, # from Compartamos, and # from a moneylender or pawnshop). Effects that
are significant at p < . 10 are in black. For some outcomes, we adjust the critical level following the Benjamini and Hochberg approach. In brackets, we then indicate whether the treatment effect is
not significant [ns] at this level if it is significant at the unadjusted level.
Figure 16: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Present−biased PreferenceOutcome: Surveyed Surveyed Surveyed
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment Assignment -0.002 -0.012 0.036
(0.031) (0.029) (0.079)
Age 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Married (omitted: single) 0.056** 0.054**
(0.022) (0.025)
Separated -0.044 -0.079
(0.049) (0.068)
Prior business owner 0.058** 0.066**
(0.021) (0.029)
Household income per adult in 
the last 30 days (000s) -0.020*** -0.023***
(0.003) (0.003)
High risk aversion -0.004 -0.002
(0.019) (0.018)
High formal credit experience -0.002 0.014
(0.018) (0.023)
Impatient now 0.014 0.002
(0.022) (0.029)
Present bias -0.027 -0.019
(0.023) (0.029)
Has had a formal account -0.096*** -0.109***
(0.019) (0.022)
Has been a member of an 
informal savings group -0.017 -0.009
(0.018) (0.021)
Above variables interacted with 
Treatment No No Yes
N 2912 2853 2853
Number of clusters 33 33 33
Outcome mean 0.626 0.627 0.627
p-value from test that Treatment 
and all other variables above 
interacted with Treatment are 
jointly 0 0.145
Appendix Table 1: Attrition
Baseline Sample Targeted for Endline Surveying
Respondents are Mexican women aged 18-60 and all reside in outlying areas of Nogales.  Column 1 reports the 
coefficient on treatment assignment when it is included in a regression with a binary variable for survey response (1=yes, 
0=no) as the outcome variable.  Column 2 reports the coefficient on each variable in the row when they are all  included 
in one regression with survey response as the outcome.  Column 3 reports the results of the test for unbalanced attrition 
between treatment and control groups. The cells show the coefficient for each variable when they are all   included in one 
regression along with each of their interactions with treatment, with  survey response as the outcome. The coefficients on 
the interaction terms (not shown) are each not significant. All regressions include supercluster  fixed  effects and standard  
errors are clustered by the unit of randomization.     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01.    Variable Description Time of measurement
Total # of household loans The number of loans taken out by members of the household Last 2 years
Total amount of household loans The amount (in pesos) of the 3 most recent loans belonging either to the respondent, or if she has 
had fewer than 3 loans in the last 2 years, belonging to her and other members of the household. 
Last 2 years
# of household loans from Compartamos The number of loans taken from Compartamos of the 3 most recent loans belonging either to the 
respondent, or if she has had fewer than 3 loans in the last 2 years, belonging to her and other 
members of the household. 
Last 2 years
Amount of household loans from 
Compartamos
The amount (in pesos) of loans taken from Compartamos of the 3 most recent loans belonging 
either to the respondent, or if she has had fewer than 3 loans in the last 2 years, belonging to her 
and other members of the household. 
Last 2 years
# of household loans from a moneylender or 
pawnshop
The number of loans taken from a money lender or pawnshop of the 3 most recent loans belonging 
either to the respondent, or if she has had fewer than 3 loans in the last 2 years, belonging to her 
and other members of the household. 
Last 2 years
Amount of household loans from a 
moneylender or pawnshop
The amount (in pesos) of loans taken from a money lender or pawnshop of the 3 most recent loans 
belonging either to the respondent, or if she has had fewer than 3 loans in the last 2 years, 
belonging to her and other members of the household. 
Last 2 years
Formal credit is 1st choice for credit Binary variable equal to one if the respondent said that a formal source--either a bank or a caja--
would be the first source she would go to if she needed a loan of 6,000 pesos tomorrow
At survey
Satisfied w/access to financial services Binary variable, taken from a question asking respondents to rank their satisfaction with access to 
financial services on a five point scale. A response of  "satisfied" or "very satisfied" was coded as 
one.  
At survey
Member of informal savings group Binary variable equal to one if the respondent was a member of an informal savings group Last 2 years
Has a business Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has a business At survey
Has ever owned a business Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has ever owned a business At survey
Used a loan to grow a business Binary variable equal to one if the respondent has used a loan to grow any of their businesses Ever
Number of employees The sum of the number of paid and unpaid employees across all of the respondent's businesses At survey
Revenues in the last 2 weeks Total revenues (pesos) from all of the respondent's businesses  Last 2 weeks
Expenditures in the last 2 weeks Total expenditures (pesos) from all of the respondent's businesses  Last 2 weeks
Business outcomes
Credit outcomes
Appendix Table 2: Data AppendixProfits in the last 2 weeks Total profits (pesos), calculated as total revenues minus total expenditures from all of the 
respondent's businesses
Last 2 weeks
Household business income last month Total household income (pesos) from business or productive activity, asked as an independent 
question 
Last month
No financial problems managing business in 
the last year
Binary variable equal to one if the respondent said that she had no financial problems managing 
her business
Last year
Did not sell an asset to help pay for a loan Binary variable equal to one if the respondent sold any asset to help pay off a loan Last 2 years
Used a loan to buy any asset Binary variable equal to one if the respondent used a loan to buy an asset Last 2 years
Amount spent on temptation goods Total consumption of sweets, soda, and cigarettes (pesos) Last week
Amount spent on groceries Total consumption of groceries   (pesos) Last 2 weeks
Nights did not go hungry The number of nights that the respondent did not go hungry Last 30 days
Amount spent on school and medical 
expenses
Total spent on school or medical expenses by the household  (pesos) Last year
Amount spent on family events Total spent on family events such as weddings, funerals, or birthdays by the household  (pesos) Last year
Asset categories bought item from The number of asset categories (of a total of 6) from which the household bought an item from Last 2 years
Did not sell an asset Binary variable equal to one if someone in the household sold an asset Last 2 years
Made home improvement Binary variable equal to one if an improvement was made to the respondent's home Last 2 years
Total income Total household income (pesos) Last month
Income from salaried and non-salaried jobs Household income (pesos) from salaried and non-salaried jobs Last month
Participated in an economic activity Binary variable equal to one if the respondent had a business at the time of the survey or worked in 
the last 30 days
-
Amount of remittances received Total remittances (pesos) received  Last 6 months
Income greater than or equal to expenses Binary variable equal to one if after excluding a purchase of a house or a car or a big investment or 
debt, the respondent's income was greater than her expenses
Last 6 months
Other welfare outcomes
Income outcomes
Consumption outcomesDepression index (higher = happier) An index of a standard battery of 20 questions that ask about the respondent's mood and thoughts 
over the last week. The feelings and thoughts include:  being bothered by things that do not 
normally bother you, having a poor appetite, not being able to shake off the blues even with 
support from friends and family, feeling just as good as other people, having trouble focusing, 
feeling depressed, feeling like everything required extra effort, being hopeful about the future, 
thinking your life was a failure, feeling fearful, having restless sleep, feeling happy, talking less 
than usual, being lonely, thinking people were unfriendly, having crying spells, enjoying life, 
feeling sad, thinking people dislike you, feeling like you couldn’t keep going on. 
At survey
Job stress index (higher = less stress) An index of three questions that ask about stress related to work over the last 30 days. The 
questions were answered on a five point scale. They included: Did you feel stressed by your job or 
economic activity? Did you find your job or economic activity prevented you from giving time to 
your partner or family? Did you feel too tired after work to enjoy the things you would like to do at 
home?
At survey
Locus of control index An index of five questions that ask about the respondent's feelings of control. The first four 
questions presented respondents with two phrases and they were asked which one they agree with 
the most. The choices were: What happens to me is my own doing vs. sometimes I feel that I dont 
have enough control over the direction my life is taking; when I make plans, I am almost certain 
that I can make them work vs. it is not always wise to plan too far ahead, because many things turn 
out to be a matter of  good or bad fortune anyhow; in my case, getting what I want has little or 
nothing to do with luck vs. many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin; 
many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me vs. it is impossible 
for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life. The fifth question asked 
respondents on a five point scale how much they agreed with the following phrase: In the long run, 
hard work will bring you a better life. 
At survey
Trust in institutions index An index of 3 questions that ask about trust in government workers, financial workers, and banks 
on a five point scale from "complete distrust" to "complete trust"
At survey
Trust in people index An index of trust in family, neighbors, personal acquaintances, people just met, business 
acquaintances, people who borrow money and strangers  on a five point scale from "complete 
distrust" to "complete trust" and a question about whether people would be generally fair. 
At survey
Satisfaction (life and harmony) index An index of one question about satisfaction with life on a five point scale from "very unsatisfied" 
to "very satisfied" and another about harmony with others on a five point scale from "very 
unsatisfied" to "very satisfied". 
At survey
Satisfied with economic situation A binary variable equal to one if the respondent said she was either "very satisfied" or "satisfied" 
with her economic situation on a five point scale. 
At surveyGood health status A binary variable equal to one if the respondent said she her health was either "very good" or 
"good" on a five point scale. 
At survey
Fraction of children 4-17 not working The fraction of children in the household aged 4-17 who the respondent says are not working. At survey
Participates in any financial decisions A binary  variable equal to one if the respondent reports participating in any financial decision 
making, based on a question that asked for how many financial decisions she participates in the 
decision making, allowing answers from "none" to "all" on a five point scale. The variable is only 
measured for married respondents living with another adult. 
At survey
# of household issues she has a say on The number of household issues (of 4) in which the respondent reports having some decision 
power on, including always making the decision, making the decision for herself, or if she makes 
the decision with another person, having some role in deciding disagreements. The variable is only 
measured for married respondents living with another adult.
At survey
# of household issues in which conflict arises The number of household issues (of 4) in which the respondent reports making the decision with 
another person and at least sometimes having a disagreement. The variable is only measured for 
married respondents living with another adult.
At surveyAnalysis Location Sample Sample Size*
Balance Table 1, Panel A Endline  16,560
Balance Table 1, Panel B Panel 1,823
Takeup   Table 2, Panel A Endline  16,560
Takeup   Table 2, Panel B Panel 1,823
Average Intent to Treat Effects Tables 3-7, Panel A Endline  16,560
Equality of Standard Deviations and Distributions Tables 3-7, Panel A Endline  16,560
Average Likelihood of Increase/Decrease from Baseline Tables 3-7, Panels B & C Panel 1,823
Quantile Treatment Effects - Business Outcomes Figure 3 Endline business owners 3,957
Quantile Treatment Effects - All Other Outcomes  Figures 4-6 Endline  16,560
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Prior Business Ownership, 
Education, Location Figures 7-9 Endline  16,560
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects - All Other Sub-Groups Figures 10-16 Panel 1,823
Attrition Appendix Table 1  Baseline  2,912
Average Intent to Treat Effects for the Panel Sample Appendix Figure 1 Endline  16,560
Loans per client Appendix Figure 2 Treatment group in administrative data 1,565
Sample by Outcome
Job stress Endline respondents with a business or job 7,772
Fraction of children not working Endline respondents with children aged 4-17 12,305
Intra-household decision power variables 
Endline respondents that are married and live 
with another adult 12,439
All other outcomes  Endline 16,560
Appendix Table 3: Sample Sizes
* Sample sizes refer to the maximum possible number of respondents within the sample. In particular parts of the analysis, the sample size will be smaller than shown 
in this column because respondents may have answered "I don't know" or "No response" for the outcome in question. Credit & Other Financial Services
Business
Income & Consumption
Other Welfare
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Used a loan to grow a business
Number of employees
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Did not sell an asset to help pay for a loan
Used a loan to buy any asset
Amount spent on temptation goods in the last week
Amount spent on groceries in the last 2 weeks
Nights did not go hungry
Amount spent on school and medical expenses in the last year
Amount spent on family events in the last year
Made home improvement
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Effect size in standard deviations of the control group or in # of loans for the borrowing outcomes ("Total #", "# from Compartamos" and "# from a moneylender")
This figure summarizes the treatment effects for the panel sample. Here treatment effects on continuous variables are presented in standard deviation units or in # of loans for the borrowing
outcomes (Total #, # from Compartamos, and # from a moneylender or pawnshop). Each line shows the OLS point estimate and 90% confidence interval for that outcome.
For some outcomes, we adjust the critical level following the Benjamini and Hochberg approach. In brackets, we then indicate whether the treatment effect is not significant [ns]
at this level if it is significant at the unadjusted level. A > symbol on an end of a confidence interval signifies that this coefficient is greater than the same coefficient for the full sample.
A < symbol means that it is less than in the full sample. The number of symbols reflects the significance of the difference using adjusted critical values.
One p < .10, two < . 05 and three < . 01.
Appendix Figure 1: Average Intent−to−Treat Effects for the Panel Sample (compare to Figure 2)0
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Number of loans per client
The figure shows the distribution of number of loans per client for all clients in the administrative
data and in the treatment group (1,514). The loans are either joint liability loans, or individual
liability loans which clients can take out after successful completion of the first joint−liability loan
cycle.
Appendix Figure 2: Number of Compartamos Loans by Client